Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2016

Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues
Karl S. Coplan
Elisabeth Haub School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Karl S. Coplan, Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal and Social Issues, 41 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 223 (2016),
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/1022/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

FOSSIL FUEL ABOLITION: LEGAL
AND SOCIAL ISSUES
Karl S. Coplan*
I. Introduction .........................................................................225
II. The Scope of the Problem ....................................................227
III. The Case for Fossil Fuel Abolition ....................................230
A. The Ethical Case: Avoiding Harm .................................230
B. The Practical Case: Scientific Necessity............................238
C. The Pragmatic Case: Realpolitik and Simplicity ..........240
1. Wicked and Super Wicked Problems ...........................241
2. Cultural Cognition Challenges for a Law-Based
Response to Climate Change .......................................244
IV. Effectuating the Ban ...........................................................246
A. Existing Statutory Authority ..........................................247
1. Clean Air Act Section 211: Prohibition of Motor
Vehicle Fuels .................................................................248
2. Clean Air Act Title I National Ambient Air Quality
Standards ......................................................................249
B. New Legislation ...............................................................253
1. Statutory Bans ..............................................................254
a. Constitutional Authority ..........................................255
i. Commerce Authority ..............................................255
ii. Treaty Power ...........................................................259
b. Constitutional Objections .........................................262
i. Takings ....................................................................262
ii. Fundamental Rights ...............................................264
c. Exceptions and Bypass Provisions ...........................269

*Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law and Co-Director, Pace
Environmental Litigation Clinic; B.A., Middlebury College, J.D., Columbia University
School of Law. I would like to thank my colleagues at Pace University School of Law,
as well as the participants in the 2014 Vermont Colloquium on Environmental Law
Scholarship for valuable feedback on an early draft of this Article. I also would like to
thank my research assistants, Cayleigh Eckhardt, Pace Law School class of 2015, and
Daniel Patrick, Pace Law School class of 2016 for their tireless efforts chasing down
sources.

223

224

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Vol. 41:2

C. Achieving a Fossil Fuel Ban Through Constitutional
Amendment ......................................................................269
V. Meeting the Social-Political Challenge of a Fossil Fuel
Ban:
The New Abolitionism Meets the Old
Abolitionism .........................................................................270
A. Can Law Change Culture? ..............................................275
B. Climate Activism in the United States: The Civil
Rights Model ....................................................................278
C. The Possible Climate Activism Analogues:
Law
Driven Social Change Paradigms in the United
States ................................................................................279
1. Civil Rights and Racial Equality Movement...............280
2. Prohibition ....................................................................285
a. Casting Industry as Villains .....................................285
b. Evolution from Moderation to Prohibition, and
from State-Level Response to Federal .....................288
c. Political Tactics .........................................................289
d. Pre-Commitment Strategy........................................290
e. Anti-Libertarianism ..................................................291
f. Assault on a Ubiquitous Consumer Product............293
g. Failure to Internalize the Social Change Goals ......293
h. Moral Underpinnings of the Movement ...................294
3. Abolition ........................................................................296
a. Cultural Acceptance of Slavery and Fossil Fuels ....298
b. Relation to Mercantilism and Need for
International Solution...............................................298
c. Evolution from Abolition to Emancipation ..............299
d. Rhetorical Parallels in the Climate and Slavery
Debates ......................................................................300
e. Social Movement Parallels .......................................301
i. Mass Petition Drives and Gatherings ...................302
ii. Lawsuits ..................................................................303
iii. Lobbying and Legislative Efforts ...........................304
iv. Direct Action and Civil Disobedience ....................304
v. Values-Oriented Social Justice Issues Framing ...304
vi. Group Identification and Product Boycotts ...........305
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................310

2016

Fossil Fuel Abolition

225

I. INTRODUCTION
The scientific community agrees that release of over 565
gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalents into the atmosphere
through 2050 would cause global warming in excess of the
maximum tolerable level.1 The Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) is even
more pessimistic with regard to the maximum tolerable level.2
We have already burned through 570 gigatons of carbon
dioxide equivalent (“CO2e”)—out of one teraton available—
leaving only 430 gigatons of burnable carbon remaining.3 Ever.
Currently, attempts to reduce the greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions rate—both domestically and globally—have focused
on gradual reductions to achieve a sustainable rate by 2050.
To date, these efforts have proven completely unsuccessful:
carbon emissions global rates continue to increase.4 Although
the IPCC has concluded that global greenhouse gas emissions
must be cut between fifty and eighty percent by 2050,5 neither
the now-lapsed Kyoto Protocol nor the most recent voluntary
national commitments have come close.6 There is no realistic
prospect that sustainable global controls on greenhouse gas
emissions will be adopted in the next decade. Instead, the
global community is on track to surpass the one teraton
available in the next fifteen to twenty years.7 At that point, the
only way to avoid climate catastrophe will be the cessation of
emissions: the global abolition of fossil fuels. Abolition will be
necessary, even though proven fossil fuel reserves of
approximately two teratons of CO2e will still be in the ground.8
1. See discussion infra Part II.
2. See id.; see also IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY, TOP LEVEL FINDINGS FROM THE WORKING GROUP II AR5 SUMMARY FOR
POLICY MAKERS, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/docs/WGIIAR5_SPM_Top_Level_
Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8XL-5ZGB] [hereinafter IPCC TOP LEVEL FINDINGS].
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. See Alex Pashley, C02 Levels Make Largest Recorded Annual Leap, NOAA Data
Shows, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/
2016/mar/10/co2-levels-make-largest-recorded-annual-leap-noaa-datashows [https://perma.cc/N8QG-LQMZ].
5. See IPCC TOP LEVEL FINDINGS, supra note 2.
6. See Max Paris, Kyoto Climate Change Treaty Sputters to a Sorry End, CBC NEWS
(Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/kyoto-climate-change-treaty-sputtersto-a-sorry-end-1.1184986 [https://perma.cc/QUX8-UFXR].
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See id.
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Climate change’s scientific logic mandates that abolition will
be necessary. Although the climate activism movement has
only recently explicitly adopted this goal, the inexorable math
of the climate problem has made this result apparent for years.
Political commentators have observed that abolition is the
logical endpoint of the climate conundrum and have begun to
speculate about the economic dislocations involved under the
mantle of “The New Abolitionism.” In 2008, Al Gore—one of
the most prominent political advocates with regard to climate
change—argued that fossil fuel use needed to be terminated
within a decade.9 The Group of Seven (“G7”) has called to end
fossil fuel use by 2100.10 Even the Saudi Arabian Minister of
Petroleum and Mineral Resources has been quoted as
envisioning an end to fossil fuels by mid-century.11
This Article will examine the practical, ethical, legal, and
socio-political implications of fossil fuel abolition. First, the
Article will consider the practical, ethical, and legal arguments
in favor of fossil fuel abolition. Then, the Article will examine
possible legal means and authorities to implement abolition in
the United States, as well as potential legal objections to fossil
fuel abolition. Finally, the Article will consider legal abolition’s
capacity to effect the far-reaching changes in our socioeconomic system that a ban on fossil fuels will entail. The
Article also will compare the climate reform movement to other
social law reform movements in the past, including the civil
rights movement, the temperance movement, and the slavery
abolition movement. The Article concludes that there are
strong practical, ethical, and legal arguments for fossil fuel
abolition. However, the climate activism movement must
mature before it is likely to achieve the necessary social
consensus to implement abolition.

9. Elana Schor, Gore Calls for End of Using Fossil Fuels for Electricity in US by
2018, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2008, 2:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2008/jul/17/algore.energyefficiency [https://perma.cc/NX58-KL2F].
10. Kate Connolly, G7 Leaders Agree to Phase Out Fossil Fuel Use by End of
Century, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/08/g7leaders-agree-phase-out-fossil-fuel-use-end-of-century [https://perma.cc/2P49-XNQA].
11. Michael Rose, Saudi Oil Minister Sees Eventual End of Fossil Fuels, REUTERS
(May 21, 2015, 11:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/21/us-saudi-oilclimate-idUSKBN0O61Y520150521?mod=related&channelName=ousivMolt
[https://perma.cc/FM86-TVJV].
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II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Even among the environmental community, the monumental
social and economic changes necessary to avoid catastrophic
climate changes are not fully understood. Simply convincing
everyone to switch their light bulbs to compact fluorescent
lighting and to trade in their conventional automobiles for
hybrids will not be sufficient. Social commentators, in addition
to recent economic and technical studies, have established that
it is possible to convert to a zero-carbon renewable energy
economy.12 However, the studies assume some fairly radical
changes in individual conduct. Americans would have to trade
their current housing stock in far-flung suburbs for ultraefficient housing in urban transit-friendly settings and
abandon their single-passenger automobile commutes for
public transportation in order to realize these zero-carbon
future visions.13 This conversion would have economic costs,
but most economists now agree that these costs would be more
than offset by future climate change response costs avoided.14
Even if economically offset, this adjustment to a new energy
economy will involve a dramatic social adjustment as existing
communities are reorganized in more energy efficient patterns.
The relentless mathematics of the climate change problem
lay bare the extreme changes necessary to accommodate a
climate-sustainable energy economy. Climate activist Bill
McKibben points out in his “Do the Math” speaking tour and
movie that the world can only afford to burn another 565
gigatons of CO2e by mid-century to avoid catastrophic climate
change.15
Oil and coal companies’ reserves exceed this
12. See Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and
Sunlight (WWS) All Sector Energy Roadmaps for the 50 United States, 8 ENERGY
ENVTL. SCI. 2093 (2015), https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/
I/USStatesWWS.pdf [https://perma.cc/95AD-WYUY] (showing through a Stanford
University study that each State can achieve 100% renewable energy by 2050); see
generally GEORGE MONBIOT, HEAT: HOW TO STOP THE PLANET FROM BURNING (2009).
13. See, e.g., MONBIOT, supra note 12, at xix.
14. See, e.g., Dana Nuccitelli, Climate Dollars and Sense—Preventing Global
Warming Is the Cheap Option, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:16 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2014/apr/22/
preventing-global-warming-cheaper-than-adapting [https://perma.cc/Y4WX-PTDN].
15. See Do the Math, 350.ORG, http://math.350.org/ [https://perma.cc/RJM9-G8U2]
(last visited Feb. 1, 2016); see also Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New
Math, ROLLING STONE (July 19, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/
global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719 [https://perma.cc/S5WU-6LFR].

228

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Vol. 41:2

threshold five-fold, and the globe is on track to cross the midcentury threshold in just fifteen years.16
Taking Bill McKibben’s math one simple step further reveals
the ultimate futility of attempting to allocate the remaining
CO2 increment: 565 gigatons of CO2 that the planet can burn
between 2013 and 2050 equals a maximum of about 15
gigatons per year. There are some 7 billion people on Earth.17
Simple division reveals an equally distributed per capita limit:
15 billion tons per year divided by 7 billion people equals
roughly 2 tons per person per year, even assuming zero
population growth.
This inexorable math reveals a fundamental challenge to
treating carbon emissions as a mere allocation problem.
Carbon pricing becomes inextricable from global anti-poverty
and distributive justice:
carbon footprints are directly
proportional to global standard of living, and the (short-term)
sustainable rate of carbon emissions is inconsistent with
current middle class standards of living in the developed world.
Assuming most peoples’ total carbon footprint is about twice
their direct personal carbon footprint,18 that leaves about one
ton per person per year globally as a maximum direct carbon
footprint. That is about 100 gallons of gasoline (20 pounds of
CO2 per gallon).19 That is enough to drive the average car
2,100 miles or a Prius hybrid 5,000 miles.20 Or it is enough for
16. McKibben, supra note 15.
17. Robert Schlesinger, The 2015 U.S. and World Populations, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP.
(Dec.
31,
2014),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robertschlesinger/2014/12/31/us-population-2015-320-million-and-world-population-72-billion
[https://perma.cc/3W9D-9SKX].
18. Although definitions of “direct” versus “indirect” carbon footprints vary, an
individual’s direct footprint can be seen as those carbon-emitting activities that an
individual has control over on a short term basis, such as individual transportation and
home heating and lighting choices, while an individual’s indirect impact includes those
carbon-emitting activities over which the individual lacks direct control, such as the
heating and lighting at one’s place of employment, the embedded carbon footprint of
durable goods used by the individual, and carbon-emitting community activities. See
How Big Is Your Carbon Footprint?, 3M WORLDLYWISE, http://www.3m.co.uk/intl/uk/
3mworldly-wise/carbon-footprint-homepage.htm [https://perma.cc/L4R7-47PV] (last
visited Feb. 1, 2016).
19.
See
Greenhouse
Gas
Equivalencies
Calculator,
EPA,
http://www2.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator [https://perma.cc/
VC3C-9VK3] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
20. See id.; see also Fuel Economy of 2015 Toyota Prius, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY,
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/bymodel/2015_Toyota_Prius.shtml
[https://perma.cc/SN6Q-QCNB] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
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a one-way flight from New York to Los Angeles (or one roundtrip flight, if one assumes the lowest carbon impacts presented
by various carbon calculators). Or, according to one online
carbon calculator, that one ton of CO2e would represent just
one-sixth of one individual’s share of the energy consumption of
a three-bedroom single family house in Atlanta that has
already implemented every available energy conservation
measure, including compact fluorescent lighting.21
Even in the short-term, a per capita allocation of the
maximum rate of carbon emission is inconsistent with the
middle class standard of living. Yet an economic allocation of
carbon emissions based on purchasing power—achieved by a
global price on carbon—would maintain existing global
inequalities of consumption and living standards.
An
allocation approach to climate change runs afoul of global antipoverty and development goals as well as notions of
distributive and historical justice. It is no accident that global
climate negotiations were frustrated by economic development
and distributive justice: the emerging economies demand an
allowance for fossil fuel-powered development commensurate
with the developed post-industrial economies; the poorer
nations of the world seek to link climate goals with global
development and anti-poverty concessions.22
This Article posits that attempts to limit carbon emissions to
the 565 gigaton increment will be unsuccessful, and that the
increment will be exhausted in the next two decades or so.
Once the increment is used, fossil fuel abolition will be the only
remaining practical response to global warming. In any event,
an equal per capita allocation of the permissible increment—
two tons per person—would essentially mean fossil fuel
abolition in the United States, as this limit represents a ninety
percent reduction in U.S. per capita emissions.

21.
See
Carbon
Footprint
Calculator,
NATURE
CONSERVANCY,
http://www.nature.org/ greenliving/carboncalculator/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9ZKB7AXF] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
22. See Magdalena Mis, 800 Million Still Hungry and Poor Despite Progress of
Millennium
Goals:
U.N.,
REUTERS
(July
6,
2015,
1:23
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/07/06/us-development-goals-unidUSKCN0PG1ZI20150706 [https://perma.cc/FQ7L-LLWL].
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III. THE CASE FOR FOSSIL FUEL ABOLITION
The case for fossil fuel abolition will rest on ethical, practical,
and pragmatic considerations. First, no system of laws—
domestic or international—will ban a practice without reaching
the conclusion that the underlying practice is unethical.23 The
ethical basis of the ban might be utilitarian or deontologically
based, but before a practice can be banned, it must be
considered wrongful.24 The ban’s ethics may be based on
simple avoidance of harm to others, utilitarian concepts of
avoiding imminent societal harm, or more inchoate ethics of
avoiding human destruction of natural systems.25 A ban is also
likely to become a practical matter of scientific necessity as the
international economic system rapidly burns through the
remaining allowable increment of greenhouse gas emissions. A
fossil fuel ban may ultimately be the most pragmatic
international response to climate change, as the simplicity of a
ban avoids the unsolvable distributive justice problems of any
system of allocating greenhouse gas emissions limits.
A. The Ethical Case: Avoiding Harm
Several writers have made the ethical case for limiting
greenhouse gas emissions,26 and this Article will not attempt to
re-argue that case. In essence, the primary argument for
limiting—and ultimately ceasing—greenhouse gas emissions
proceeds from the basic ethical principle of avoiding harm to
others.27
Burning fossil fuels results in greenhouse gas
emissions that will change the global climate in ways that will
interfere with food production and cause sea level rise.28 These
changes will cause grievous harms to people globally, from food
23. STEVEN BARKAN, LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 150 (2009).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., Paul Baer, Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common
Resources, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A SURVEY 394 (Stephen Schneider et al. eds., 2002);
John C. Dernbach & Donald A. Brown, The Ethical Responsibility to Reduce Energy
Consumption, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 985 (2009); Richard C.J. Somerville, The Ethics of
Climate Change, YALE ENV’T 360 (June 3, 2008), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/
the_ethics_of_climate_change/1365/ [https://perma.cc/86QD-UE9N].
27. See Dernbach & Brown, supra note 26.
28.
Climate
Impacts
on
Global
Issues,
EPA,
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/
international.html [https://perma.cc/B8JF-2Z9U] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
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shortages, flooding, and civil strife as climate refugees move to
higher ground.29 Even if the global temperature increase is
limited to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels,
grievous environmental and human harms are likely to result:
the complete inundation and destruction of low-lying island
nations, and a high-risk of casualties affecting millions of
people from extreme weather events including hurricanes,
floods, and heat waves in sensitive areas.30 As the global
temperature increases, the risk of disruptions to unique
ecosystems, extreme weather events, inequitable distribution of
impacts burdening the poor, global aggregate impacts, and
large scale events all become “high” or “very high.”31 As these
thresholds are exceeded, the partial loss of Arctic summer ice
and the complete loss of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet become
likely, causing even more extreme sea level rise, coastal
inundation, and climate refugees.32 Additionally, the risk of
reaching a global “tipping point” where thermal feedbacks
cause a climate shift to a much hotter global climate
unrecognizable to human beings is amplified.33 These grievous
harms make it unethical to cause greenhouse gas emissions in
excess of a nation’s or an individual’s fair share, and these
harms will make it unethical to emit any greenhouse gases
once the global increment is depleted.
Although some utilitarian ethical systems allow for harm to
others to serve a greater good, no system of ethics allows
29. See id.
30. See Petra Tschakert, Commentary, 1.5°C or 2°C: A Conduit’s View from the
Science-Policy Interface at COP20 in Lima, Peru, Climate Change Responses, 2015 2:3,
at 1, http://climatechangeresponses.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40665-0150010-z [https://perma.cc/EU5Q-VKML].
31. Id. at 9 fig.3; IPCC TOP LEVEL FINDINGS, supra note 2.
32. See Global Warming Puts the Arctic on Thin Ice, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/qthinice.asp [https://perma.cc/5KBN-SXHZ] (last
visited Mar. 8, 2016); see also Carolyn Gramling, Just a Nudge Could Collapse West
Antarctic Ice Sheet, Raise Sea Levels 3 Meters, SCI. MAG. (Nov. 2, 2015, 3:00 PM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/11/just-nudge-could-collapse-west-antarctic-icesheet-raise-sea-levels-3-meters [https://perma.cc/R2CN-XVKC].
33. JOHN C. AYERS, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 13 (2011), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/
Sustainability/book/S1C6.pdf [https://perma.cc/92BU-7GSF]; Brian Kahn, Scientists
Predict Huge Sea Level Rise Even If We Limit Climate Change, GUARDIAN (July 10,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jul/10/scientists-predict-hugesea-level-rise-even-if-we-limit-climate-change [https://perma.cc/R2TT-SNX5]; see also
Anders Levermann & Johannes Feldmann, Collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet
After Local Destabilization of the Amundsen Basin, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14191
(2015).
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grievous harms to others to provide luxuries to some. This has
led commentators to conclude that greenhouse gas emissions,
other than for basic sustenance and shelter, are unethical—at
least as long as no allocation system exists to prevent the
harms from occurring.34 A white paper prepared by the Rock
Institute has concluded that no system of ethics would justify
continued emissions of greenhouse gases by developed nations
in excess of an equal per capita allocation of the remaining
GHG increment.35 Principles of distributive justice require
priority be given to the least well-off, and principles of
compensatory justice require that those who have benefited
most from past greenhouse gas emissions have the weakest
claim to an allocation exceeding equal distribution.36
Some have argued that no ethical responsibility is owed to
persons not yet in existence.37 However, as Professor Simon
Caney points out, this argument fails on two grounds.38 First,
climate change is harming and will harm people who already
exist—today’s children will suffer the future impacts of climate
change.39 Second, there is no ethically-valid reason to ignore
harms to future persons.40 Future persons will have the same
fundamental right to the basic human needs for food and
shelter as people now in existence.41
Another possible objection to an ethical duty to avoid
greenhouse gas emissions is the collective nature of the harm:
no single individual’s or nation’s greenhouse gas emissions can
be independently responsible for the global climate harms.42
However, there should be an ethical duty to avoid aggregate
harms once it is clearly apparent that they are occurring.43
34. See Dernbach & Brown, supra note 26; Simon Caney, Justice and the
Distribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 5 J. GLOBAL ETHICS 125 (2009).
35. See generally DAVID BROWN ET AL., ROCK ETHICS INSTITUTE, WHITE PAPER ON
THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), http://rockethics.psu.edu/
documents/whitepapers/edccwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DUP-8NG5].
36. See id.
37. See Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global Climate Change, 19
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 255 (2006).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 272–73.
40. See id. at 263.
41. See id.
42. See Joakim Sandberg, “My Emissions Make No Difference”: Climate Change
and the Argument from Inconsequentialism, 33 ENVTL. ETHICS 229 (2011).
43. WOUTER PEETERS ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
(2015).
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This principle is similar to the imposition of joint and several
liability for joint tortfeasors, where harm is not divisible.44
The aggregate nature of global climate harm might also
argue in favor of a regulatory approach, rather than a ban.
The ethical arguments to date have focused on emitting
greenhouse gases in excess of an individual’s or a nation’s fair
share, begging the question of what a fair share is. However,
this argument loses force once the permissible increment of
cumulative GHG emissions has been reached—at that point
everyone’s fair share of allowable emissions will be zero. There
may have a been a time when the global climate system could
be allocated like the sheep meadow in Garrett Hardin’s tragedy
of the commons, but that time has almost passed.45
The collective nature of the climate harm may bear on the
ethical case for a ban on fossil fuels in another way—by
interrupting the but-for causal link between individual conduct
and harm. As there is no direct causal link between any
individual’s use of fossil fuels and harm to any other person—
present or future—the ethical case for banning fossil fuel use
may not be as strong as for prohibiting homicide or assault, for
example.
However, this causation argument has been
46
refuted.
44. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009); United
States v. BestFoods Corp., 524 U.S. 51 (1998); United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1952).
45. Katha Pollitt, Climate Change is the Tragedy of the Global Commons, NATION
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/climate-change-tragedy-globalcommons/ [https://perma.cc/T3SM-RALE].
46. Ben Almassi has written a persuasive analysis of the individual moral
responsibility for climate change’s collective harms. Ben Almassi, Climate Change and
the Ethics of Individual Emissions: A Response to Sinnott-Armstrong, 4 PERSP. INT’L
POSTGRADUATE J. PHIL. 15 (2012). Almassi responded to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s
suggestion that, due to the lack of but-for causation for climate change, there is nothing
morally wrong with driving a gas guzzling SUV “just for fun.” See id.; see also Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral
Obligations, in PERSPECTIVES ON CLIMATE CHANGE 221–53 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong &
R. Howarth eds., 2005). Almassi draws on the threshold nature of climate change
causality, reasoning that since all individual emissions increase the likelihood that
climate change thresholds will be surpassed, and since no individual can be sure that
their own emissions will not cause the threshold to be passed, individual “luxury”
emissions are morally wrong even without certainty of a but-for causal relationship to
a climate change harm to any individual. See Almassi, supra, at 15. He also notes the
“contagious” nature of luxury emissions, which encourages other people to engage in
such conduct and expands the effective emissions beyond those of the individual actor.
See id. at 16.
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The collective nature of the harm should not stand in the way
of a ban. Environmental laws have banned other forms of
collective harms, such as the use of lead additives in motor
vehicle fuels47 or the individual taking of an endangered
species.48 These bans recognize the necessity of banning
individual conduct that increases the likelihood of a negative
environmental result, despite the lack of direct but-for
causation.
It bears noting that the utilitarian concern for harms to
persons—present and future—is not the only possible ethical
basis to limit or ban climate altering greenhouse gas emissions.
Utilitarian concerns solely based on the adverse effects of
climate change on human beings constitute a form of
anthropocentric ethics—one that only recognizes intrinsic
value in human beings, but not in environmental integrity
itself.49 The environmental ethics awakening of the midtwentieth century recognized that non-human animals and
natural systems also have intrinsic value worthy of recognition
in any system of utilitarian ethics. The so-called “deep ecology
movement” recognized that all living things have their own
intrinsic value.50 Environmental ethics that respect natural
systems and hold that humans have no ethical right to destroy
them, would hold that humans must avoid activities that
destroy nature—including the natural climate system. This is
the basis of Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic”:
the idea that
something is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community, and wrong when
it tends otherwise.51
This environmental ethic underlies such legislation as the
Endangered Species Act and the Wilderness Act.52 It has its

47. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012).
49. Andrew Brennan & Yeuk-Sze Lo, Environmental Ethics, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS (E. N. Zalta ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/ethics-environmental/ [https://perma.cc/7QDN-28E9].
50. Arne Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement, 16
INQUIRY 95 (1973), reprinted in THE DEEP ECOLOGY MOVEMENT: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANTHOLOGY 3–9 (Alan Dregson & Yuichi Inoue eds., 1995).
51. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 262 (1949).
52. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533–44 (2012); Wilderness
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (2012); see also Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered
Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1999).
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roots in the basic human moral instincts of purity53 and the
corresponding natural human appreciation for nature.54 This
basic principle of environmentalism supplements the
anthropocentric utilitarian harm-avoidance arguments for
banning fossil fuels.
This environmental ethic is itself a form of utilitarianism,
one that recognizes non-human ecological values as goal
worthy. Non-utilitarian approaches to ethics exist as well.
Deontological ethics is a form of rule-based or authority-based
ethics; actions are judged by their consistency or inconsistency
with an ethical maxim.55 The Ten Commandments are a form
of deontological ethics.56 Aldo Leopold’s land ethic might also
be considered a form of deontological ethics.57 Application of
deontological ethics to the issue of climate change may be
problematic, as deontological ethics are indeterminate—there
is no objective way to determine whose “authoritative” ethical
maxims are the correct ones. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the
United States has cast some doubt on reliance on deontological
(non-utilitarian) ethics as a source of liberty-reducing
prohibitions in criminal law. In Lawrence v. Texas—striking
down laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy—Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion stated:
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under
the Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate
state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual
sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy.
It is not.
Moral
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is
an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause. . . . Indeed, we have never
held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state
interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection

53. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED
15 (2012).
54. Nicholas A. Robinson, Evolved Norms: A Canon for the Anthropocene, in RULE
OF LAW FOR NATURE 46–71 (Christina Voigt ed., 2014).
55. See J.P. Moreland, Ethics Theories: Utilitarianism vs. Deontological Ethics,
CHRISTIAN RES. INST. (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.equip.org/article/ethics-theoriesutilitarianism-vs-deontological-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/HS3Q-92Q7].
56.
See WILFRED BECKERMAN, ECONOMICS AS APPLIED ETHICS:
VALUE
JUDGEMENTS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 80 (2011).
57.
J. BAIRD CALLICOTT, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC:
ESSAYS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (1989).
BY POLITICS AND RELIGION
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Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of
persons.58

Lawrence, in essence, rejected a deontological ethical
maxim—the asserted Biblical prohibition against homosexual
conduct—as a rational basis for drawing distinctions among
people. This passage suggests that laws seeking to enforce
deontological moral norms, unsupported by utilitarian ethical
principles, might not survive rational basis scrutiny under
either the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.59
With this caveat that deontological—authoritarian, rulebased—ethics may be a weak source of legal proscriptions, it
bears noting that world religious leaders are moving in the
direction of recognizing a proscription against harming the
global climate system on theological grounds.
The most
striking recent development, of course, is Pope Francis’s
Laudato Si’—an encylical on the environment and climate
change issued on June 18, 2015.60 Pope Francis wrote that:
The creation accounts in the book of Genesis contain, in their
own symbolic and narrative language, profound teachings about
human existence and its historical reality. They suggest that
human life is grounded in three fundamental and closely
intertwined relationships: with God, with our neighbor and with
the earth itself.61
....
. . . A very solid scientific consensus indicates that we are
presently witnessing a disturbing warming of the climatic
system. In recent decades this warming has been accompanied
by a constant rise in the sea level and, it would appear, by an
increase of extreme weather events, even if a scientifically
determinable cause cannot be assigned to each particular
phenomenon. Humanity is called to recognize the need for
changes of lifestyle, production and consumption, in order to

58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003).
59. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Susan Austin Blazier, The Irrational
Use of Rational Basis Review in Lawrence v. Texas: Implications for Our Society, 26
CAMPBELL L. REV. 26, 31–32 (2004).
60. See POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LAUDATO SI’ OF THE HOLY FATHER
FRANCIS
ON
CARE
OF
OUR
COMMON
HOME
(June
18,
2015),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco_20
150524_ enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/LJQ9-R7ZD].
61. Id. at para. 66.
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combat this warming or at least the human causes which produce
or aggravate it.62

Pope Francis has thus brought Catholic orthodoxy into the
creation care movement of Christianity, which similarly holds
that humans are stewards of God’s creation and have a
responsibility to preserve the global ecosystem intact.63 This
recognition of stewardship obligations stands in contrast to the
so-called “dominion” theory of Judeo-Christian environmental
thought, which relies on the Biblical injunction to humans to
“be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue
it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over fowl of
the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the
earth.”64 Following Pope Francis’s lead, a group of Islamic
religious and environmental leaders issued its own call to
phase out non-renewable energy and stop greenhouse gas
emissions no later than 2050.65
There is thus some
deontological ethical support for a prohibition on burning fossil
fuels.
The third major rule of ethical thought—virtue ethics—also
provides ambiguous support for a prohibition against fossil fuel
use. Virtue ethics looks to the motivations and character traits
of the moral actor rather than to the effects (utilitarian) or
rule-compliance (deontology) of the acts in question.66 Virtue
ethics has its roots in the ancient Greek philosophical
traditions of Socrates and Aristotle, and seeks to promote a
state of individual harmony through actions consistent with
personal virtues such as courage, honesty, rationality,
friendliness, and loyalty.67 As virtue ethics seeks to promote
individual self-realization and a state of harmony, its
62. Id. at para. 23.
63. See European Parliament Address by Pope Francis, C-SPAN (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.c-span.org/video/?323063-1/pope-francis-address-european-parliament
[http://perma.cc/24W6-8GU2].
64.
See ANDREW KERNOHAN, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS:
AN INTERACTIVE
INTRODUCTION 194 (2012).
65. Denise Hassanzade Ajiri, Islamic Leaders Echo Pope’s Call for Action on
Climate Change, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/
Science/2015/0818/Islamic-leaders-echo-pope-s-call-for-action-on-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/U6NX-66XZ].
66. See P. Gardiner, A Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Dilemmas in Medicine, 29
J. MED. ETHICS 297 (2003).
67. See id.
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application to a problem such as climate change may be
impossibly anthropocentric and subjective. However, at least
one writer has suggested that the virtue ethics values of love,
respect, and care may apply to the non-human environment as
well.68
In sum, once the remaining increment of non-catastrophic
greenhouse gas emissions has been exhausted, there will be a
compelling utilitarian ethical case for an outright ban on the
burning of fossil fuels, based both on the avoidance of harm to
people and on the ethic of non-interference with natural
ecosystems. Deontological and virtue ethics may also support
such a ban, but with less certainty.
B. The Practical Case: Scientific Necessity
Once the greenhouse gas increment is used up, it will be
impossible to avoid catastrophic harms while continuing to
burn fossil fuels. Indeed, the two degrees Celsius of warming
associated with that increment itself contemplates significant
climate change and disruption to human settlement patterns,
agriculture, and sea level.69 Once this point of unacceptable
impacts is reached, there is no other possible response to the
crisis of global climate change and sea level rise other than
banning further fossil fuel combustion.
The possible
alternative responses of geoengineering, carbon sequestration,
or adaptation are likely to prove inadequate as alternative
responses.
Although geoengineering techniques, such as sulfate aerosol
dispersal to increase atmospheric reflectivity to solar radiation,
have been suggested as a lower cost means of mitigating
climate change, the available science neither supports the
effectiveness nor safety of these techniques. A recent National
Academy of Sciences report casts doubt on the feasibility of
geoengineering as a practical matter—though it calls for
further research.70
Available models suggest that
geoengineering responses to climate change will have their own
serious climate impacts, such as disruption of the Indian
68. See John O’Neill, The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, 75 MONIST 119 (1992); see
also JOHN BARRY, RETHINKING GREEN POLITICS 32 (1999).
69. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC IMPACTS ASSESSMENT 1–3 (1990).
70. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL
AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION 19–20 (2015).
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monsoon essential to agricultural productivity on the Indian
subcontinent.71 Geoengineering is also inherently unstable, as
it depends on constant human intervention to maintain the
climate. If geoengineering efforts are halted for any reason—
such as war, unrest, or economic crises—extremely rapid and
destructive climate change will follow.72
Carbon sequestration and storage has also been suggested as
an alternative measure that would allow continued use of fossil
fuels—particularly coal—while mitigating the greenhouse gas
impacts. Although some demonstration carbon capture and
storage (“CCS”) plants are up and running, none promise to be
economically feasible or competitive with non-GHG emitting
renewable energy.73
The third alternative response to climate change—so-called
adaptation—is also an unacceptable alternative to the
cessation of fossil fuel use. Adaptation measures propose to
adjust human settlement and agricultural patterns to changing
climate and rising sea level.74 They include such measures as
relocating coastal communities and engineered shore protection
measures to cope with sea level rise.75 The fundamental
problem with reliance on adaptation measures is one of cost
and resources; adaptation depends on financial resources to
implement engineered responses to sea level rise as well as the
availability of fertile land in newly-productive agricultural
regions. Such measures will be unavailable to the gravest
71. See David Shukman, Geo-engineering: Climate Fixes “Could Harm Billions,”
BBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30197085
[https://perma.cc/HLV4-SV84].
72. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Geoengineering Is Fast and Cheap, but Not the Key to
Stopping Climate Change, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/2015/may/15/geoengineering-climate-change-greenhouse-gases
[https://perma.cc/MAT9-R5G5].
73. Chris Nelder, Why Carbon Capture and Storage Will Never Pay Off, ZDNET
(Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/why-carbon-capture-and-storage-willnever-pay-off/ [https://perma.cc/HR2V-K3QB]; Ken Zweibel, Should Solar Photovoltaics
Be Deployed Sooner Because of Long Operating Life at Low, Predictable Cost?, 38
ENERGY POL’Y 7519, 7528 (2010) (discussing the competitive quality of photovoltaic
systems as compared with traditional energy production).
74. See generally Ian Burton, Adaptation to Climate Change and Variability in the
Context of Sustainable Development, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 153 (Luis
Gómez-Echeverri
ed.,
2000),
http://environment.yale.edu/publicationseries/documents/downloads/a-g/Burton.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU8R-WJL8].
75. See, e.g., Mark Gibbs, Coastal Communities Need Implementable Plans—Even
If Politically Unpopular, PHYS.ORG (Dec. 4, 2015), http://phys.org/news/2015-12-coastalplanseven-politically-unpopular.html [https://perma.cc/XJA4-YDMJ].
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victims of climate change in the Global South, where refugees
from rising sea level and desertification are likely to lack the
resources and lands needed to adapt.76 Adaptation is a
strategy for the wealthy nations, but is unlikely to work for
poor nations.77 When it becomes clear that adaptation will not
prevent the unacceptable humanitarian impacts of climate
change, drastic mitigation measures will become necessary.
C. The Pragmatic Case: Realpolitik and Simplicity
The history of effective environmental law reform is,
unfortunately, one of reaction rather than proaction. The
Clean Air Act was adopted in response to smog-choked cities,
the Clean Water Act in response to the Cuyahoga River in
flames, and the Superfund cleanup law in response to the
evacuation of contaminated communities at Love Canal and
Times Beach.78 The current U.S. and international political
climate suggests that an effective response to climate change is
also likely to be reactive rather than proactive: that is,
effective measures to mitigate climate change are not likely to
be adopted until after grave humanitarian crises
unambiguously caused by climate change are apparent.79 At
that point, by definition, any allocable increment of greenhouse
gas emissions will have been used up. A proactive allocation
response to limit greenhouse gas emissions rates is also
unlikely to be successful because allocation problems are the
hardest problems for environmental regulation to solve,
invoking both distributive justice issues and libertarian
resistance to government direction of private activity.
It appears nearly impossible that the global community, let
alone the United States, will implement an allocation scheme

76. See Ruth Gordon, The Triumph and Failure of International Law, 34 N.C.
CENT. L. REV. 63, 75 (2011).
77. See generally Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity,
42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11125 (2012).
78. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 465, 524, 679 (4th ed.
2010).
79. See Nsikan Akpan et al., Why the Paris Talks Won’t Prevent 2 Degrees of Global
Warming, PBS (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/why-the-paristalks-wont-prevent-2-degrees-of-global-warming/
[https://perma.cc/UAP5-4LUN]
(“Even if aggressive deals are reached in Paris . . ., climate change could still be on
track to drive millions from their homes through drought, famine, sea-level rise and
extreme storms like cyclones.”).
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for the remaining 565 gigatons of useable fossil fuels before the
increment is already used up. Several structural factors
militate against successful enactment and implementation of
an effective allocation scheme. These include both the cultural
cognition challenges facing the reality of climate science, the
related tendency of major legislation to be responsive to an
observed crisis rather than an anticipated one, along with the
“super wicked” nature of the climate response problem—at
least as long as it is defined as an allocation problem.80 The
world appears destined to suffer at least some of the
devastating impacts of climate change, and by the time a
response is implemented, the only possible mitigation may be a
complete ban on burning fossil fuels.
1. Wicked and Super Wicked Problems
Professor Richard Lazarus has famously described climate
change as a “super wicked problem.”81 The term “wicked
problem” was originally coined in the planning literature as a
problem that cannot be defined without reference to potential
solutions, leading to intractable path dependencies for
pluralistic negotiation of problem definition and resolution.82
The term has been expanded to include problems with multiple
definitions, interdependence between problem definition and
solution, and polycentric competing interests affected by both
the problem and its proposed resolutions.83 Professor Lazarus
describes climate change as a “super wicked problem” because
climate change has the added complications of the cost of
delayed action, the lack of incentive to act by the parties best
positioned to address the problem, and the lack of sufficient
governmental structures to respond to the scope of the
problem.84 Significantly, Professor Lazarus anticipates that a
successful legal response to climate change will require a
“precommitment strategy” to remove the legal framework from

80. See Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1178, 1181–82 (2009).
81. See id. at 1159.
82. See generally Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General
Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160–69 (1973) (introducing the term “wicked
problems” to describe nature of social policy problems).
83. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1159–61.
84. See id.
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the action of ordinary politics once the wrenching reallocations
required by the response come into play.85
By definition, “wicked problems” are those problems whose
definition depends in part on the nature of the proposed
solutions.86 So long as the solution to climate change remains
an allocation scheme—whether it is allocation via carbon
pricing schemes such as cap and trade or carbon taxes,
allocation via rationing, or international allocation via
negotiated allowances as in the Kyoto Accords87—climate
change will remain a super wicked problem, as multiple
solutions
and
multiple
stakeholders
compete
for
implementation and allocation.
The allocation problem
necessarily becomes mired in intractable debates about the
relative merits of carbon taxes versus a system of cap and
trade,88 as well as the fundamental distributive justice
problems involved in any allocation scheme.89 Moreover, any
system of allocation of carbon emissions requires the
construction of a highly-complex system of accounting and
monitoring to ensure proper allocation of limits and
compliance.90 On the other hand, climate change might cease
to be a wicked problem if the global community—prompted by
leadership from the most powerful nations—came to realize
that burning fossil fuels in an industrialized world is always
unsustainable and a violation of basic human values due to the
harms it causes, as the global community eventually came to
view slavery.91 If the solution is perceived to be as simple as a
ban, the complexities and competing interests for allocation
disappear, and the problem may no longer be “wicked.” The
practical question is whether—and when—such a global
consensus might appear.
As a practical matter, statutory bans have been more
effective in U.S. environmental law than environmental

85. See id. at 1158.
86. See C. West Churchman, Wicked Problems, 14 MGMT. SCI. 151 (1967).
87. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, FED. MINISTRY FOR ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION,
BLDG. & NUCLEAR SAFETY, http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/
international-climate-policy/kyoto-protocol/
[https://perma.cc/89MU-LFWD]
(last
updated Oct. 23, 2015).
88. See Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1186.
89. Id. at 1185.
90. Id. at 1186.
91. See infra Section V.C.3.
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quality-based allocation schemes. The quality-based emissions
allocation approaches of both the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act have failed on their own terms, with forty
percent of U.S. water bodies still listed as impaired as of 2014
and over 160 air quality areas still failing to meet national
ambient air quality standards.92 It is no accident that these
quality based regulatory schemes have not been fully
implemented, as the allocation elements of compliance93
require hard political choices about how to allocate scarce
emissions resources. Flat environmental prohibitions, such as
the ban on taking endangered species94 or the ban on lead in
gasoline implemented under the Clean Air Act,95 have been
more effective in achieving their environmental goals.
Addressing climate change at the global level poses even more
intractable allocation challenges, as the developing nations
have a compelling argument based on principles of distributive
justice for larger allocations than the industrialized nations
that are largely responsible for the problem, while the
industrialized nations are loath to give up the economic
advantages of their outsized share of global emissions.96 Barry
Commoner, one of the founders of the late twentieth century
environmentalist movement, argued decades ago for the
simplicity and effectiveness of outright bans.97

92. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN WATER ACT AND
POLLUTANT
TOTAL
MAXIMUM
DAILY
LOADS
2
(2012),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42752.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WK2-JSQR]; Criteria
Pollutant
Nonattainment
Summary
Report,
EPA
(Oct.
1,
2015),
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/ancl3.html#Notes [https://perma.cc/ TTT5VZVT] (listing nonattainment areas).
93. This includes Total Maximum Daily Loads under the Clean Water Act and
State Implementation Plans under the Clean Air Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C)
(2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
94. The Endangered Species Act Works: 100 Success Stories, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY,
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_works/
[https://perma.cc/HJT4-38NN] (last visited May 29, 2016) (“The Endangered Species
Act is one of the most successful environmental laws in U.S. history and America’s
foremost tool for protecting biodiversity.”).
But see infra notes 229–230 and
accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 110–111 and accompanying text.
96. See Gordon, supra note 76, at 75.
97. Barry Commoner, Why We Have Failed, in LEARNING TO LISTEN TO THE LAND
163, 164–65 (Bill Willers ed., 1991).
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2. Cultural Cognition Challenges for a Law-Based Response
to Climate Change
As self-government evolves as a global norm, legislative
response to social problems is increasingly dependent on
achieving political consensus that action is required. However,
achievement of the level of political consensus necessary to
support effective measures to mitigate climate change in the
developed world must overcome several cognitive biases that
militate against timely political consensus concerning the need
to respond to climate change. These cognitive biases include
avoidance of cognitive dissonance, the availability heuristic,
loss aversion, status quo preferences, optimism, confirmation
bias, inability to process low-probability events, and framing.98
In addition, what Professor Dan Kahan calls “cultural
cognition,” or beliefs based on social group identification, works
against acceptance of climate science by self-identified
conservatives and Republicans in the United States.99
These cognitive factors all militate against a strong
legislative response to climate change, at least in the shortterm. Even as public opinion polls show growing acceptance of
climate science in the United States, these same polls continue
to place climate change near the bottom of public rankings of
the importance of the issue.100 This may be the availability
heuristic at work: without recent, visible examples of the harm
caused by climate change, the issue will take a back seat to
economic issues and violent conflicts.101
Similarly, it is hard to think of another example where any
system of government took action to prevent a predicted future
cataclysm for which there was no past example. Cassandra’s
98. See Karl S. Coplan, Climate Change, Political Truth, and the Marketplace of
Ideas, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 545, 553 (2012); see also GEORGE MARSHALL, DON’T EVEN
THINK ABOUT IT: WHY OUR BRAINS ARE WIRED TO IGNORE CLIMATE CHANGE 20 (2014).
99. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 149 (2006).
100. Coral Davenport & Marjorie Connelly, Most Republicans Say They Back
Climate
Action,
Poll
Finds,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
30,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/ us/politics/most-americans-support-governmentaction-on-climate-change-poll-finds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WQZ3-DWSU]; Seth
Motel, Polls Show Most Americans Believe in Climate Change, but Give It Low Priority,
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/23/mostamericans-believe-in-climate-change-but-give-it-low-priority/ [https://perma.cc/M79MG5ME].
101. See Coplan, supra note 98, at 554–55.
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warnings to King Priam of Troy were absolutely correct but
were ignored, and her name has ironically become synonymous
with undue alarmism.102 Major legislative initiatives in the
United States, as elsewhere, have all been taken in response to
visible crises that were already under way: the New Deal
economic regulations and safety nets adopted in the wake of
the Great Depression, civil rights legislation adopted in
response to visible injustice and violence directed at African
Americans, and our system of environmental regulation
adopted in the wake of visible pollution disasters such as Love
Canal, Times Beach, Missouri, and the Cuyahoga River in
flames.103
No such legislative initiatives resulted from
predictions of future harm in the absence of recent exemplars.
This reactive nature of legislative initiative, unfortunately,
suggests that any major legislative response will be deferred
until the effects of climate change reach visible, unambiguous,
crisis proportions. No weather or climate event to date in the
United States has reached such proportions. Hurricanes
Sandy and Katrina, summer heat waves, and unprecedented
tornado outbreaks are not sufficiently certain to prompt this
response. The scientific consensus that supports anthropogenic
climate change is lacking on the issue whether any of these
specific weather events can be attributed to climate change as
opposed to natural variability in weather.104
It is hard to say when such a series of weather catastrophes
sufficiently certain to be climate change-related will occur, but
by definition they will not occur until catastrophic climate
change is already upon us.105 In such case, it will already be
too late for a system of allocation and rationing of fossil fuels:
the world will surpass the 565 gigaton limit long before events
prompt an effective legislative response. As Bill McKibben’s

102. See Philip Davies, The Cassandra Complex: How to Avoid Generating a
Corporate Vision That No One Buys Into, in SUCCESS IN SIGHT: VISIONING 103–04
(1998) (describing mythology of Cassandra); Diego Gambetta, Reason and Terror, BOS.
REV., April/May 2004, http://bostonreview.net/us/diego-gambetta-reason-and-terror
[https://perma.cc/3QUR-LAVS] (stating that many people do not want to be seen as an
undue alarmist like Cassandra).
103. PLATER, supra note 78.
104. Kevin E. Trenberth et al., Attribution of Climate Extreme Events, 5 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 725 (2015).
105. See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation:
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 (2010).
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analysis has pointed out, the world is on track to exceed this
increment by 2030.106
As this increment is passed and global temperatures
continue to rise, the grievous humanitarian harms of global
climate change will eventually become apparent and
undeniable. Once a pattern of extreme weather events such as
heat waves, floods, storms, and coastal inundation becomes
undeniable, the U.S. political system may be expected to reach
consensus and respond to the threat as it ultimately did to the
extreme environmental disasters of the mid-twentieth century.
At that point, there will likely be a political consensus that a
response to climate change is necessary. There will be no
increment of greenhouse gas emissions left to allocate, and a
ban on fossil fuels will be the only effective mitigation against
further, more severe climate impacts.
IV. EFFECTUATING THE BAN
Assuming that at some point in the future a political
consensus supporting a ban on fossil fuels develops, there
remains the question of what legal form such a ban would take.
While the most obvious vehicle for such a ban would appear to
be federal legislation under the commerce or treaty powers,
there is the possibility of effectuating such a ban
administratively under the existing authority to regulate motor
vehicle fuels under the Clean Air Act’s section 211, or by
designating greenhouse gases as a criteria pollutant under
Title I of the Act and imposing a ban as part of a federal
implementation plan. Keeping in mind Professor Lazarus’s
suggestion that the social resistance to greenhouse gas
regulations might require a precommitment strategy that
removes the ban from ordinary political processes,107 we should
consider the possibility of effectuating such a ban via
constitutional amendment or statutory independent agency.
This Part of the Article will summarize possible sources of legal
authority to accomplish such a ban in the United States,
keeping in mind that decades may pass before such a ban is

106. Bill McKibben, Why I’ll Get Arrested to Stop the Burning of Coal, YALE ENV’T
360 (Feb. 19, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/why_ill_get_arrested_to_stop_the_
burning_of_ coal/2124/ [https://perma.cc/HV8D-2F35].
107. See Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1158.
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accomplished and that the state of law will undoubtedly change
between now and then.
A. Existing Statutory Authority
Some of the most effective U.S. regulatory environmental
responses have taken the form of outright bans on products or
activities implemented pursuant to statutory authority broad
enough to encompass such bans.
The Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) banned the use of the pesticide
DDT—with a limited public health exception—in 1972 under
the existing authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act with a prod from the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.108
The DDT ban is credited with restoring
endangered populations of peregrine falcons and bald eagles.109
Similarly, EPA banned lead additives in gasoline in 1996 under
the Clean Air Act’s section 211, which allows EPA to ban fuel
additives as well as fuels.110 The ban on lead additives had
huge public health benefits, and may even be responsible for
the decline in crime rates in the early years of the twenty-first
century.111 EPA has also banned the manufacture and use of
polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) under the authority of the
Toxic Substances Control Act.112
Although it may not currently be politically exercisable,
existing authority under the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to
ban the use of fossil fuels, both for mobile and stationary
sources. Clean Air Act section 211 grants EPA broad authority
to prohibit the sale of specific motor vehicle fuels, while Title I
of the Clean Air Act allows EPA to establish National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for criteria pollutants and a

108. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
109. Scott W. Reed, Fish Gotta Swim: Establishing Legal Rights to Instream Flows
Through the Endangered Species Act and the Public Trust Doctrine, 28 IDAHO L. REV.
645, 652–53 (1992) (citing MICHAEL BEAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM,
AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORT 369–70 (1986)).
110. See Prohibition on Gasoline Containing Lead or Lead Additives for Highway
Use, 61 Fed. Reg. 3,832, 3,832 (Feb. 2, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80);
Regulation of Fuels, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(n) (2012).
111. Rick Nevin, How Lead Exposure Relates to Temporal Changes in IQ, Violent
Crime, and Unwed Pregnancy, 83 ENVTL. RES. 1, 21 (2000).
112. See Polychlorinated Biphenyls Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in
Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 40 C.F.R. pt. 761 (2016).
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federal implementation plan to achieve such standards where
state implementation plans are unable to do so.
1. Clean Air Act Section 211: Prohibition of Motor Vehicle
Fuels
Clean Air Act section 211(c) provides that:
The Administrator may, from time to time on the basis of
information obtained under subsection (b) of this section or other
information available to him, by regulation, control or prohibit
the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offering for sale, or
sale of any fuel or fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle, motor
vehicle engine, or nonroad engine if, in the judgment of the
Administrator, any fuel or fuel additive or any emission product
of such fuel or fuel additive causes or contributes to air
pollution . . . that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the
public health or welfare . . . .113

This section gives EPA the clear authority to ban the
manufacture or sale of fossil fuels for motor vehicle and
nonroad engines. All fossil fuels generate carbon dioxide as an
emissions product.114
Carbon dioxide is the principle
greenhouse gas.115 Greenhouse gases are clearly air pollutants
and cause air pollution; the Supreme Court so held in
Massachusetts v. EPA.116 The Administrator has already made
a determination that greenhouse gas pollution endangers the
public health and welfare.117 This finding was sustained
against industry challenge by the D.C. Circuit118 and left
undisturbed by the Court.119
Section 211(c)(2) requires that, before imposing such a ban,
the Administrator must consider all relevant scientific and

113. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (2012).
114.
Overview of Greenhouse Gases:
Carbon Dioxide Emissions, EPA,
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.html
[https://perma.cc/F4KM-HAGN] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
115. Id.
116. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also Overview of EPA
Endangerment Finding, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/overview-epaendangerment-finding [https://perma.cc/Y4NQ-QBBD] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
117. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496–546 (Dec. 15,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).
118. Delta Constr. Co. v. EPA, 783 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
119. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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medical data, make a further finding that emissions controls
cannot prevent air pollution causing the endangerment, and
make a further finding that the ban of a fuel under this section
will not cause the use of substitute fuels that cause a greater
endangerment.120 It would seem that the Administrator could
make such findings—there is no conceivable emissions control
(such as carbon capture and storage) that might control carbon
dioxide emissions from mobile sources, and non-fossil fuel
substitutes such as electric power, hydrogen fuels, or biomassderived liquid fuels would not cause greater greenhouse gas
impacts than fossil fuels.
2. Clean Air Act Title I National Ambient Air Quality
Standards
Section 211 of the Clean Air Act is limited to transportation
fuels, so it would not provide complete authority to EPA to
prohibit the use of fossil fuels in other economic sectors,
particularly the electrical generation, agricultural, and cement
production sectors. However, the NAAQS regulatory program
for criteria pollutants under Title I of the Clean Air Act would
provide sufficient authority to prohibit the use of fossil fuels in
this sector, as well, for an EPA inclined to exploit its authority
to the fullest.
Clean Air Act Title I establishes a program of health and
welfare based ambient air quality standards, the NAAQS.121
States must develop plans—State Implementation Plans
(“SIP”)—designed to bring air quality within the state into
compliance with these standards.122 If EPA determines that a
State’s implementation plan will not achieve compliance with
an air quality standard, EPA may adopt a Federal
Implementation Plan (“FIP”) with federally enforceable control
measures that would apply within the state.123
Section 108 of the Clean Air Act provides for the designation
of criteria pollutants for which NAAQS will be established.

120. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2) (2012).
121.
See Key Federal Laws:
The Clean Air Act, CHEMALLIANCE.ORG,
http://www.chemalliance.org/tools/?subsec=25 [https://perma.cc/NX79-KBWV] (last
visited Mar. 10, 2016).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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This section directs the Administrator of EPA to establish the
criteria pollutants list for those air pollutants:
(A) emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare;
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results from
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before
December 31, 1970 but for which he plans to issue air quality
criteria under this section.124

As noted, EPA has already made the finding that greenhouse
gases endanger public health and welfare.125 In a 1976 case,
NRDC v. Train, the Second Circuit held that despite the
conditional last sentence of this provision, once the
Administrator has made the endangerment finding for a
pollutant under any other section of the Act, listing of that
pollutant as a criteria pollutant becomes mandatory.126
Whether listing of GHGs as criteria pollutants is mandatory or
discretionary, the Administrator clearly has the discretionary
authority under section 108 to list them based on the prior
endangerment finding.
If GHGs were listed as criteria pollutants, the Administrator
would be charged with developing the NAAQS for GHGs.127
Because the endangerment finding for GHGs was based on
health concerns and public welfare concerns, the Administrator
would be charged with establishing primary NAAQS for these
pollutants.128 The primary NAAQS must be set at a level that,
124. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012).
125. See Overview of EPA Endangerment Finding, supra note 116.
126. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1976); CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY & 350.ORG, PETITION TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL POLLUTION
LIMITS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2009),
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/global_warming_liti
gation/clean_air_act/pdfs/Petition_GHG_pollution_cap_12-2-2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JXH-6FK4]; Zachary D. Ludens, Stemming a Rising Tide: Why the
Clean Air Act Following Massachusetts v. EPA Provides a Sensible Vehicle Through
Which to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 251 (2013); Patricia
Ross McCubbin, EPA’s Endangerment Finding For Greenhouse Gases and the Potential
Duty to Adopt National Ambient Air Quality Standards to Address Global Climate
Change, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437 (2009).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012).
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“allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect
the public health.”129 Based on current science, a limit of
somewhere between 350 and 400 ppm of CO2e in the
atmosphere is necessary to prevent the most catastrophic
health impacts of global warming.130
Once a NAAQS for GHGs were established, each State would
be charged with amending its SIP to demonstrate compliance
with the GHG NAAQS within three years.131 Of course, due to
the global nature of greenhouse gas emissions, no SIP could
possibly demonstrate compliance with a GHG NAAQS, as
atmospheric GHG concentrations are beyond the control of any
one State. EPA could thus use its authority under section
110(c) of the Clean Air Act to reject the SIPs as inadequate and
to adopt a nationwide FIP for GHGs.132 EPA has broad
discretion to incorporate measures necessary to achieve a
primary NAAQS. As with the SIPs, a FIP:
Shall . . . include enforceable emissions limitations and other
control measures, means, or techniques (including economic
incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of
emissions rights) . . . as may be necessary or appropriate to meet
the applicable requirements . . . .133

Regulations included in a FIP are federally enforceable.134
This authority appears broad enough to include a ban on fossil
fuels as the only effective means to meet a NAAQS for GHGs.
There is precedent for EPA using the FIP process to address
intractable interstate air pollution issues that are beyond the
reach of individual state SIPs. In 1998, EPA issued the socalled “NOx SIP Call,” requiring States to revise their SIPs in
order to address ozone NAAQS violations in downwind states,
as required by the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.135
129. Id.
130.
See
The
Science,
350.ORG,
http://350.org/about/science/
[https://perma.cc/NVH3-4JZH] (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2012).
132. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 62 (2016) (setting forth the Administrator’s approval and
disapproval of SIP plans based on satisfaction of the requirements of the relevant
section of the Clean Air Act).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2012).
134. Id. § 7410(a)(5)(A)(i).
135. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (providing the final NOx SIP
Call).
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EPA’s authority to issue the SIP call was upheld in Michigan v.
EPA.136 When States failed to submit adequate revisions, EPA
imposed a FIP that incorporated an interstate emissions
trading scheme—the Clean Air Interstate Rule (“CAIR”).137
Although portions of the CAIR were struck down on judicial
review, EPA’s basic authority to implement a FIP with detailed
regulatory requirements for individual pollution sources was
upheld.138
The successor rule to the CAIR, the Cross-State Air
Transport Rule, maintains these regulations and the interstate
trading scheme adopted by the CAIR, and this approach
survived review by the Supreme Court.139
In another
interstate pollution situation, the EPA adopted the Regional
Haze Rule, requiring reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions at
power plants in states that were upwind of national parks and
other areas designated for exceptional air clarity.140 EPA
subsequently rejected inadequate SIP submissions for
compliance with the regional haze emissions limits and instead
imposed its own individual emissions limits for individual
power plants as part of a FIP.141 These FIP limits were upheld
by the Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v. EPA.142
Although it might be argued that a FIP banning fossil fuel
use nationwide might itself be insufficient to make progress
towards achieving a hypothetical GHG NAAQS, given the
global nature of the problem, it seems unlikely that any court
would strike down such a FIP on the grounds that it was
insufficiently rigorous. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held
that a SIP—and implicitly a FIP—need not take technological
or economic feasibility into account in establishing limits on
emissions.143

136. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
137.
See Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), EPA, http://archive.epa.gov/
airmarkets/programs/cair/web/html/index.html [https://perma.cc/CFX7-HEE6] (last
visited Mar. 8, 2016) (describing CAIR and stating that it was replaced in 2015 by the
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule).
138. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
139. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
140. Regional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714 (July 1, 1999) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
141. Id.
142. Oklahoma v. EPA, 723 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013).
143. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
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At least theoretically, then, existing statutory authority
under the Clean Air Act would allow EPA to ban the use of
fossil fuels in both mobile and stationary sources. Imposition of
such a ban through administrative action by an executive
agency would fall within the long tradition of presidential
executive actions in response to crises, such as President
Lincoln’s adoption of the Emancipation Proclamation and
President Franklin Roosevelt’s imposition of bank holidays
during the Great Depression.144 Action pursuant to existing
statutory authority such as the Clean Air Act, in response to a
global crisis such as catastrophic climate change, would make
such executive action relatively likely to survive judicial
review.145 Nevertheless, such action could not be taken unless
the national political climate were sufficiently favorable to
avoid congressional action repealing EPA authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions.146
B. New Legislation
Although the Clean Air Act likely provides sufficient
authority for the Executive Branch to effectuate a nearcomplete ban on the use of fossil fuels, a future President
seeking to implement such a ban may wish to have more
specific legislative authority, or it may be that a future
Congress may take the lead in implementing climate
protections.
Indeed, the great environmental protection
initiatives of the early 1970s—NEPA, the Clean Air Act, and
the Clean Water Act—were all legislative initiatives taken with
the reluctant cooperation of President Nixon.147
Past
legislation illustrates the effectiveness of statutory bans in
achieving environmental results. Congress could ban the sale
144. See President Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863),
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_proclamation/inde
x.html [https://perma.cc/WB8C-NYEB]; President Franklin Roosevelt, Proclamation
2040—Bank Holidays (Mar. 9, 1933), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14485
[https://perma.cc/6SZZ-5G86].
145. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
146. S. 66, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 4813, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 30, 113th
Cong. (2014); H.R. Con. Res. 57, 113th Cong. (2014).
147. Although President Nixon created the EPA and signed the 1970 Clean Air Act
into law, he vetoed the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (now
known as the Clean Water Act), which was passed over his veto. See Domestic Politics,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/nixondomestic/ [https://perma.cc/ZF3Q-P6UK] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
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or use of fossil fuels in the exercise of its power to regulate
interstate commerce or as an exercise of the treaty power
(assuming an international treaty banning fossil fuels were
negotiated).148
Although there might be constitutional
objections to such a ban based on the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment or based on a claim of deprivation of some
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, such claims are unlikely to succeed. As with
other absolute bans, there is some risk that exceptions and
bypass
provisions
will
be
adopted
legislatively,
administratively, or judicially.
1. Statutory Bans
Congress has in the past reacted to environmental crises by
adopting statutory bans on environmentally harmful activities.
Such bans have included the Endangered Species Act’s
prohibition against taking or trading in endangered species,
the “Delaney Clause” prohibition against cancer causing
chemical residues in food products, and the phaseout of ozone
depleting chlorofluorocarbons.149 Such legislative bans are
almost certainly within the scope of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power, and might also be effectuated under the Treaty
Clause power. Although some have questioned whether Fifth
Amendment takings compensation might be due to holders of
fossil fuel reserves in the event of such a ban,150 existing
precedent precludes a claim for such compensation.151
However, such statutory bans on ubiquitous activities tend to
provoke bypass provisions and exceptions—whether created by

148. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
149. See Endangered Species Act § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012); Food Additives
Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 4, 72 Stat. 1784, 1785–86 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012)); Phaseout of Class I Ozone-Depleting Substances,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/ods-phaseout/phaseout-class-i-ozone-depleting-substances
[https://perma.cc/H96D-N8RZ] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
150. Nicholas S. Cortese, Note, Drawing Lines in the Shale: Local Zoning Bans, the
Takings Clause, and the Clash to Come If New York State Promulgates Hydrofracking
Regulations, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 489, 508 (2014); Christopher Hayes, The New
Abolitionism, NATION (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/newabolitionism/ [https://perma.cc/C2X7-KKB7]; Mireya Navarro, New York Judge Rules
Town
Can
Ban
Gas
Hydrofracking,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
21,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/nyregion/town-can-ban-hydrofracking-ny-judgerules.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2PSP-AYGA].
151. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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a. Constitutional Authority
i. Commerce Authority
Most environmental regulation and prior statutory bans have
been implemented as an exercise of Congress’s commerce
power. The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes.”152 This grant of authority to
regulate commerce has expanded over the years to include
plenary authority to regulate in three categories related to
interstate movement of goods and value: (1) instrumentalities
of commerce—that is, objects moving in commerce and the
transportation infrastructure that moves them, (2) channels of
commerce, and (3) activities which, in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce.153
The Supreme
Court’s modern decisions have put a further gloss on this third
category, requiring that the effect on commerce be
“substantial,” that the regulated activity itself be “economic”
activity, and implicitly, that the power claimed by Congress not
be so broad as to usurp the general police powers reserved to
the States under our system of federalism.154 Under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress enjoys such legislative
powers as are “appropriate” to implement its regulation of
commerce.155
The Court upheld Congress’s exercise of the third category of
the commerce power to adopt general environmental protection
legislation in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n.156 In Hodel, coal mining trade associations and States
challenged provisions of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act requiring that surface mine operators restore
and revegetate land disturbed by surface mining activities.157
The Court had no trouble finding that the environmental
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
153. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
154. Id. at 559.
155. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38 (2005); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 415 (1819).
156. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
157. Id. at 268.
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effects of surface mining had an impact on interstate commerce
sufficient to invoke the commerce power, and the Court
specifically endorsed the rationale that uniform national
environmental standards were an appropriate limitation on
economic competition by States to lower their environmental
standards.158
Nevertheless, Congress’s power to protect environmental
values pursuant to the Commerce Clause is not unlimited. The
Court has in recent decades limited the scope of the commerce
power, albeit in non-environmental contexts. In United States
v. Lopez, the Court struck down provisions of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act that criminalized mere possession of a
firearm on school grounds, holding that Congress may not
regulate non-economic activity, such as mere possession of an
object, based on inferences about the aggregate impacts of such
conduct on interstate commerce.159 Likewise, in United States
v. Morrison, the Court struck down provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act making certain acts of violence committed
against women a federal crime, rejecting congressional findings
that violence against women throughout society had a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.160
These cases suggest that the Court will not uphold regulation
of non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause based
solely on an aggregate impact of the activity on the national
economy. These cases may cast some doubt upon Congress’s
power to protect environmental values from private, nonbusiness conduct. Indeed, Chief Justice John Roberts, then
sitting as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, expressed doubt that the
Endangered Species Act could constitutionally be applied to a
property owner’s fence construction that potentially interfered
with the habitat of an endangered toad that lived only in
California.161
Clearly, Congress would have the authority to ban the
quintessentially economic activities of purchasing and selling

158. Id. at 280.
159. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
160. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
161. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Roberts, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1159 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (referring to fence
construction as non-economic activity like gun possession).
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fossil fuels pursuant to the Commerce Clause as well as
quintessentially commercial activities such as importation and
interstate transportation of fossil fuels. There can be no
serious question that fossil fuel sales and commerce, as well as
the climate change impacts of greenhouse gases, substantially
affect the national economy. There may be a wrinkle when it
comes to a ban on fossil hydrocarbons for fuel use.
Hydrocarbons have commercial uses other than as fuels, such
as chemical feedstocks for manufacturing and fertilizers.162 A
ban on fossil fuels would have to allow for commerce in fossil
hydrocarbons for non-fuel, non-GHG generating uses, while
simultaneously banning the use of such fossil hydrocarbons for
GHG-emitting energy production. Such a ban on the private
use of an otherwise lawful substance might arguably be
considered non-economic conduct beyond the reach of the
commerce power, just like the fence construction in the
challenge to the Endangered Species Act prohibition against
taking an endangered species.
The Supreme Court addressed the question of bans on
personal possession and use of illicit drugs under the
Controlled Substances Act in Gonzales v. Raich and held that
individual possession bans were authorized under the
Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution as an
appropriate means of implementing the comprehensive
regulation of an interstate market in illicit drugs.163 The Court
reached this conclusion despite the premise that such
possession and use was not an economic activity and would not
be subject to commerce power regulation except for its
connection to the interstate market in illicit drugs.164 Raich
thus suggests that Congress might ban individual possession
and use of fossil fuels as part of an overall ban on the
manufacture, transport, or sale of fossil fuels in interstate
commerce. Raich does not fully address the question of
whether the commerce power authorizes Congress to regulate
the possession or use of a substance for particular purposes
(such as the use of fossil hydrocarbons as fuel rather an as
162. See Overview of Greenhouse Gases:
Nitrous Oxide Emissions, EPA,
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/n2o.html
[https://perma.cc/3AM7-W8TT] (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
163. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
164. Id.
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chemical feedstocks). Nonetheless, the Controlled Substances
Act also prohibits possession of certain specified drugs for illicit
purposes—i.e., the possession or use of prescription drugs
without a prescription.165
Raich only addressed the
constitutional validity of the total ban on possession or use of
Schedule I controlled substances. However, its reasoning that
such a ban is “necessary and proper” to implement regulation
of the interstate market in these drugs is arguably broad
enough to support a ban on possession or use for particular
purposes.
The Court’s more recent decision rejecting the commerce
power as authority for enactment of the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”)—National Federation of Independent Business v
Sebelius166—might also be read as casting some doubt on
Congress’s authority to regulate private, non-commercial
conduct, such as the use of fossil fuels for heating or
transportation purposes. In Sebelius, the Court held that the
individual mandate provision of the ACA was not a valid
exercise of the commerce power or the Necessary and Proper
Clause.167 The individual mandate provision of the ACA
requires all individuals, subject to certain income limitations,
to purchase health insurance.168 The Court held that neither
the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause
could be construed to reach individual inactivity and require
affirmative conduct such as the purchase of a service in the
market.169 As far as the commerce power was concerned, the
Court held that inactivity was by its very nature non-economic
and thus not subject to regulation based on aggregate
substantial impacts on the national economy.170 As far as the
necessary and proper power was concerned, the Court held that
the Necessary and Proper Clause could not be read to invoke a
“great substantive and independent power,” such as a
regulation requiring affirmative activity.171 A ban on the use of
fossil fuels would not seem to run directly afoul of Sebelius, as
Congress would clearly be regulating activity rather than
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2587.
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587, 2592.
Id. at 2589.
Id. at 2591.
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inactivity. However, the Court’s expansive notion of what
individual conduct counts as “non-economic” might plausibly be
argued to preclude regulation of private, noncommercial
individual use of fossil hydrocarbons.172
ii. Treaty Power
In order to be effective in mitigating global climate change, a
ban on fossil fuels will necessarily have to reflect a global
consensus that such a ban is necessary. Such a consensus is
also likely to find reflection in an international treaty to which
the United States will be a party. The treaty power—combined
with Congress’s implementation authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause—would be an obvious alternative source of
legislative authority to implement an international ban on the
use of fossil fuels.
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution grants the
President the “Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.”173 Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of
the Constitution provides that “[t]he Congress shall have
Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”174 As the treaty power is one of the powers vested by
the Constitution in the U.S. government, the Necessary and
Proper Clause, by its terms, authorizes Congress to adopt
legislation to execute the treaty power.
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court interpreted the
combined treaty power and Necessary and Proper Clause
expansively.175 The Court upheld federal legislation limiting
hunting seasons for migratory waterfowl as a necessary and
proper means of implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty
between the United States and the United Kingdom (on behalf
of Canada).176 According to the Court, “[i]f the treaty is valid
172. See generally James R. May, Healthcare, Environmental Law, and the
Supreme Court, 43 ENVTL. L. 233 (2013).
173. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
175. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
176. See id. at 435.
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there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” that
implements it “as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government.”177 The Court rejected a Tenth
Amendment challenge to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that
was based on the States’ traditional exclusive role in regulating
the hunting of wild animals.178
Missouri v. Holland remains the Court’s only direct
statement on the scope of Congress’s power to implement U.S.
treaties through domestic legislation. There is an implicit limit
on the scope of the Holland holding, in that the underlying
treaty must be “valid” and must deal with a subject that is an
appropriate matter for an agreement among nations. The
Court had no trouble finding that the protection of migratory
birds that transit across international boundaries was an
appropriate matter for an international treaty. So, too, would a
limitation on the use of fossil fuels whose emissions cross
international boundaries and which are causing a global
climate crisis be an appropriate matter for an international
treaty. Indeed, greenhouse gas emissions are already subject
of one international treaty to which the United States is a
signatory—the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.179 In addition, the principle that all nations
have an obligation to limit pollution emissions within their
borders that cause harmful impacts beyond their borders is
now a well-established principle of customary international
law.180 Indeed, the case widely seen as establishing the
customary international law principle against cross-boundary
pollution, the Trail Smelter Arbitration, is directly applicable
to the cross-boundary pollution issues of climate change.181 It
would appear that under existing law, Congress would have
ample authority to implement a ban on the use of fossil fuels as
177. See id. at 432.
178. Id.
179. See generally U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.
180. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib.
1941); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), annex I
(Aug. 12, 1992).
181. Russell A. Miller, Surprising Parallels Between Trail Smelter and the Global
Climate Change Regime, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS
FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds.,
2006).
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a means of implementing an international treaty adopting such
a ban.
It is hard to predict whether the expansive treaty
implementation power of Missouri v. Holland will survive until
fossil fuel abolition becomes a political reality. The Court
recently avoided revisiting Missouri v. Holland in Bond v.
United States.182
Bond addressed the application of the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 to
a domestic crime of attempted poisoning with a chemical
substance.183 A majority of the Court declined to address the
scope of the necessary and proper power to implement a treaty
by criminalizing conduct traditionally regulated by the
States.184 Rather, the Court applied the “clear statement” rule
of avoiding constitutional issues by interpreting the statute
narrowly, as being inapplicable to Bond’s purely domestic
criminal conduct.185 Three Justices dissented however, and
would have reached—and narrowed—the scope of the Treaty
Clause implementation power.186
Justice Scalia’s dissent
reasoned that the Necessary and Proper Clause literally only
authorizes legislation that supports the making of treaties, and
not legislation supporting the implementation of a treaty once
made.187 This reasoning would overrule Missouri v. Holland
and would not authorize implementing legislation effectuating
a hypothetical international treaty banning the use of fossil
fuels. Justice Thomas’s dissent in Bond would limit the treaty
power itself to authorize only treaties dealing with conduct of
relations between nations, rejecting any treaty that purports to
address the conduct of individual citizens.188 Under Justice
Thomas’s approach, a treaty prohibiting the use of fossil fuels
would be beyond the scope of the treaty power. It remains to be
seen whether either of these positions ultimately garners the
support of a majority on the Court.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014).
Id. at 2083.
Id. at 2081.
Id. at 2088.
Id. at 2102.
Id. at 2098.
Id. at 2103.
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b. Constitutional Objections
Whether a ban on fossil fuels is implemented legislatively or
administratively, there will likely be constitutional objections
made to the ban.
Some commentators have questioned
whether owners of fossil fuel reserves should be entitled to
compensation for the loss of value of their assets.189 Under
current law, such a claim is not likely to succeed under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.190 Constitutional
resistance to the ban on fossil fuels might also take the form of
a fundamental rights based claim, most likely based on the
right to travel.
i. Takings
Oil, gas, and coal reserves reported by energy sector
companies represent approximately five times more burnable
carbon than can safely be converted to greenhouse gas carbon
dioxide without exceeding the two degrees Celsius that the
IPCC considers the maximum survivable increase in planetary
temperatures.191 An effective response to climate change—
which, as explained above, is most likely to take the form of a
ban on fossil fuels once the increment is reached—will
effectively require that these reserves largely be left in the
ground. This has led to discussion in the financial press about
whether these energy companies are overvalued by a market
that continues to attribute value to these unburnable
reserves—a so-called fossil fuel asset bubble.192 This situation
led Christopher Hayes to suggest that these energy companies

189. Hayes, supra note 150.
190. Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
191. Do the Math, supra note 15.
192. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., BLOOMBERG CARBON RISK VALUATION TOOL
(2013),
http://about.bnef.com/content/uploads/sites/4/2013/12/BNEF_WP_2013-1125_Carbon-Risk-Valuation-Tool.pdf [http://perma.cc/BK6R-68W5]; NICK ROBINS,
ANDREW KEEN & ZOE KNIGHT, COAL AND CARBON: STRANDED ASSETS: ASSESSING THE
RISK
(2012);
Unburnable
Fuel,
ECONOMIST
(May
4,
2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/
business/21577097-either-governments-are-notserious-about-climate-change-or-fossil-fuel-firms-are.
[http://perma.cc/ZHR7-PHMV];
Financial Analyses of Stranded Assets & the Carbon Bubble, U. WIS.-OSHKOSH,
http://www.uwosh.edu/es/climate-change/divestment/carbon-bubble
[http://perma.cc/89EU-KVEV] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
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may be entitled to compensation should climate regulations
destroy the value of their assets.193
There is some historical precedent for compensating asset
holders for the loss of value associated with a radical
restructuring of economic arrangements. When Great Britain
abolished slavery in its colonies in 1833, the legislation
provided for approximately twenty million pounds of
compensation to be paid to the slaveholders—the equivalent of
16.5 billion pounds in 2013.194 This payout represented forty
percent of the annual spending budget of Great Britain at the
time.195 The United States, of course, did not pay compensation
to slaveholders upon the adoption of the Emancipation
Proclamation or the Thirteenth Amendment.
If anything, the business of extracting and selling fossil fuels
may seem to be less inherently morally repugnant than the
business of buying, selling, and forcing the labor of human
beings. At first blush, the fossil fuel industry’s legal and
fairness-based claims for compensation may seem stronger
than those of the nineteenth century slaveholders. Fifth
Amendment Takings doctrine, however, would not support a
claim for compensation by owners of stranded fossil fuel assets.
A government ban on fossil fuels would not constitute a
physical appropriation or destruction of personal property by
the government, so a traditional takings claim would not lie.196
The Supreme Court long ago rejected a takings claim in an
analogous case of regulatory asset obsolescence in Mugler v.
Kansas.197 In Mugler, a distillery owner argued unsuccessfully
that Kansas’s prohibition against the production or sale of
alcoholic beverages constituted an unconstititutional taking of

193. Hayes, supra note 150 (comparing the demands of the opponents of slavery
and the opponents of fossil fuels, both of which ask “that some of the wealthiest people
in the country . . . give up their wealth”); see also Cortese, supra note 150, at 491
(arguing that regulation which prevents mineral rights holders from exploiting their
property interests may lead to regulatory takings claims).
194. NICHOLAS DRAPER, THE PRICE OF EMANCIPATION 2 (Cambridge University
Press, 2010); Legacies of British Slave-Ownership, U. C. LONDON DEP’T HIST. (2015),
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/project/context/ [http://perma.cc/NC2R-ECV2].
195. Sanchez Manning, Britain’s Colonial Shame: Slave-Owners Given Huge
Payouts After Abolition, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/home-news/britains-colonial-shame-slave-owners-given-huge-payouts-afterabolition-8508358.html [http://perma.cc/BHD8-9CLS].
196. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979).
197. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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the distillery, which was rendered worthless by the ban.198
Mugler has been applied more recently by lower courts to reject
takings claims based on the value-destroying effects of fishing
quotas on trawlers199 and double-hull safety requirements on
newly obsolete single-hulled oil barges.200 In Andrus v. Allard,
the Supreme Court rejected a takings challenge asserted
against the Endangered Species Act prohibition against the
sale or interstate transportation of articles made from
endangered species.201 A ban on the sale and use of fossil fuels
would seem to present a weaker claim for compensation than
the claim rejected in Allard, as such a ban would not eliminate
all possible marketable uses for fossil fuels. For example,
crude oil would still be a valuable feedstock for chemical,
fertilizer, and plastics production.
A fairness-based claim for compensation is also less than
compelling. The political system owes business corporations no
duty to protect asset values against obsolescence. Anyone
investing in fossil fuel reserves since the turn of the twentyfirst century has done so with full knowledge of the scientific
consensus that an effective response to global warming would
entail severe restrictions on the continued use of fossil fuels.
The entire theory of our capitalist free market economic system
is that those who invest in a business with full knowledge of
the existential threats facing that business deserve no
protection from their market losses.202
ii. Fundamental Rights
Legislation that effects a radical social or economic
restructuring not uncommonly meets judicial resistance, often
in the form of recognition or expansion of previously
unrecognized “fundamental rights” protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thus, the Missouri Compromise, seeking to confine slavery to
the existing southern states, spawned the Court’s expanded
recognition of the substantive property rights of slave owners
198. Id.
199. See Conti v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 532, 536 (2001).
200. Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
201. See generally Andrus, 444 U.S. 51.
202. See, e.g., Matthew J. Gustin, The O’Bannon Court Got It Wrong: The Case
Against Paying NCAA Student-Athletes, 42 W. ST. L. REV. 137, 147 (2015).
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protected by the Due Process Clause in Dred Scott v.
Sandford.203 Wage and hour legislation empowering workers
in relation to their employers was held to violate a substantive
right to “freedom of contract” in Lochner v. New York.204 State
and federal attempts to limit the traditional power of moneyed
interests in politics gave rise to cases such as First National
Bank v. Bellotti and Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission, recognizing and expanding a right to political
expression on the part of business corporations.205 Even the
National Federation of Independent Business case, rejecting the
commerce power justification for the Affordable Care Act’s
restructuring of the health care industry in the United States,
can be read as an implicit endorsement of an unrecognized
right to refrain from entering into a contract, as Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion for the majority in that case reasoned that to
force individuals to purchase health insurance involved the
exercise of a “great substantive and independent power”
beyond the scope of the powers implied by the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the Constitution.206
It can be expected that a restructuring of the energy economy
as extreme as a ban on the use of fossil fuels will attract some
sort of rights-based constitutional challenge. Recognition of an
autonomy-based fundamental right to burn fossil fuels seems a
bit far-fetched under current Supreme Court doctrine, which
has resisted expansion of autonomy-based fundamental rights
to include practices that cause harms that the legislature seeks
to limit. Thus, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined
to recognize an autonomy-based fundamental right to lifeending medical choices.207 Similarly, the Court limited the
extent of its protection of the free exercise of religion when
confronted with a religious practice—peyote use—deemed by
the legislature to be harmful.208
A more likely vehicle for a rights-based challenge to a ban on
the use of fossil fuels might be a claim of an impermissible
burden on the constitutionally recognized right to interstate
203. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
204. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
205. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2015); First Nat’l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
206. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).
207. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
208. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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travel. The right to travel has a long pedigree, having first
been recognized by Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell,
which held that “the right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture and professional pursuits” is a privilege or
immunity protected by Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution.209 This right of free interstate movement was
likewise recognized in The Slaughterhouse Cases as being one
of the few federal privileges and immunities protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.210 The Court struck down a one-dollar fee on
persons exiting Nevada in Crandall v. Nevada, finding the
power to levy any tax on interstate travel to be inconsistent
with federal sovereignty.211 In United States v. Guest, the
Court upheld a civil rights indictment for interfering with the
right to travel, calling the right “fundamental.”212 More
recently, in the latter part of the twentieth century, the Court
has struck down durational residency requirements for state
public assistance benefits as violative of the right to interstate
migration, grounding its analysis in heightened equal
protection scrutiny213 and Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
and Immunities.214
The right to travel encompasses a
fundamental right to unfettered interstate travel, while the
right to international travel is subject to reasonable
restrictions.215 Although the Supreme Court has suggested in
dicta that there is no fundamental right to intrastate travel,
circuit courts remain split on the question.216
Even assuming a ramping up of renewable energy
technologies, a ban on fossil fuels will likely make long distance
travel much more expensive or much less convenient.
Although liquid biofuels are already proven substitutes for

209. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823).
210. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
211. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
212. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764 (1966).
213. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
214. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
215. See Raymond C. James, The Right to Travel Abroad, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 838,
838–40 (1974).
216. Andrew C. Porter, Toward a Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate
Travel, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 820, 821 (1992).
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fossil fuels for ground and air transportation,217 the planetary
energy balance dictates that renewable liquid fuels can never
be as plentiful—and therefore as cheap—as fossil fuels have
been.218
Accordingly, a ban on fossil fuels might be subject to a claim
that the extreme increase in the cost of long distance travel
constitutes an unconstitutional burden on the right to
interstate travel. Such a claim is plausible, but would be
unlikely to succeed under current law. In Williams v. Fears,219
the Supreme Court declared that the “right of locomotion” was
a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause in considering a
challenge to a Georgia license tax on emigrant agents. The
Court found that the tax impacted the right to interstate travel
only indirectly.220 Nevertheless, the Court has rejected claims
that the right to drive a car is fundamental, upholding
restrictions on qualifications for driver’s licenses and declining
to require pre-deprivation process for license suspension or
revocation.221
Circuit courts have similarly rejected claims against
regulations making air travel more expensive or less
convenient. Most memorably, the Ninth Circuit rejected a
claim that the effect of air travel rate regulation was to make
air travel unaffordable in violation of the constitutional right to
travel.222 The Court declared that a “rich man can choose to
drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor
man’s lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate,

217. See Don Looper & Aaron Ball, Feel the Heat: Biofuels Are a Hot Investment,
but Don’t Get Burned . . ., HOUS. LAW. MAG., Jan./Feb. 2007, at 22, 23–24.
218. With the exception of nuclear energy, all fuels represent stored solar energy
that has reached Earth. Fossil fuels consist of solar energy that was amassed and
stored over a period of millions of years and consumed in a matter of centuries. Where
Does
the
Energy
in
Fossil
Fuels
Come
From?,
MICH. TECH. U.,
http://techalive.mtu.edu/meec/ module19/Page4.htm [https://perma.cc/GK6S-V4VY]
(last visited May. 15, 2016). Renewable energy, by definition, can only represent the
amount of solar energy that has reached the Earth over the same time frame that it is
consumed. Thus, renewable energy can never be as plentiful as fossil fuels have been
during the two centuries of intense fossil fuel consumption since the industrial
revolution.
219. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
220. See id. at 278.
221. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112–16 (1977).
222. Monarch Trav. Servs. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, 466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1972).
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but it is not unconstitutional.”223 The Fifth Circuit similarly
rejected a challenge to air routing regulations that made air
travel less convenient, declaring “the argument reduces to the
feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the
most convenient form of travel.
That notion, as any
experienced traveler can attest, finds no support
whatsoever.”224
These cases, however, provide an exception where the effect
of the regulation burdening individual locomotion has the effect
of completely cutting off available means of travel.225 A
complete ban on fossil fuels might make transcontinental and
intercontinental air travel prohibitively expensive for all but
the wealthiest members of society, opening up such a ban to a
claim that it effectively precludes such travel in violation of the
constitutional right.
While no court has characterized such an interest as a
fundamental right subject to heightened scrutiny, two district
court decisions in the Ninth Circuit have recognized that the
expense and burdens of alternatives to air transport for
international trips make the denial of the option of air travel
the equivalent of a ban on international travel. According to
the Northern District of California:
While the Constitution does not ordinarily guarantee the right to
travel by any particular form of transportation, given that other
forms of travel usually remain possible, the fact remains that for
international travel, air transport in these modern times is
practically the only form of transportation, travel by ship being
prohibitively expensive.226

These district courts addressed the Transportation Security
Agency’s “No-Fly List” and determined that the excluded air
passengers had a due process protected liberty interest which
guaranteed the provision of adequate procedures for an
individual to challenge their inclusion on the list. These courts
223. Id. at 554.
224. City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Green v.
Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (stating right to travel is
subject to reasonable restrictions).
225. See generally Timothy Baldwin, The Constitutional Right to Travel: Are Some
Forms of Transportation More Equal Than Others?, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 213 (2006).
226. Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 (D. Or. 2013) (citing Ibrahim v.
Homeland Security, 2012 WL 6652362, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2012)).
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did not declare that the right to international air travel was a
fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, Supreme
Court precedent precludes a declaration that the right to
international travel is a fundamental right.227
c. Exceptions and Bypass Provisions
There are few true absolutes in the law. As Professor
Zygmunt Plater has observed, the history of absolute
prohibitions in environmental law has been a history of
judicial, administrative, and legislative exceptions and
bypasses.228 The best example of this process is the prohibition
against any federal project that would threaten the continued
existence of a species, contained in section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act.229 The absolute prohibition of section 7 ultimately
gave way to the section 7(e) endangered species committee
process for exempting federal activities deemed sufficiently
important from the ban.230
Other attempts at absolute bans have likewise drawn
statutory or judicial exceptions. The Thirteenth Amendment
ban on involuntary servitude, for example, has been
interpreted not to prohibit military conscription231 or prison
labor.232 During prohibition, Congress legislated an exemption
from the ban on the production or sale of alcohol for
sacramental wine.233 It is hard to predict what exceptions and
bypasses may arise under a ban on fossil fuel use; one can
easily imagine an exception for national defense uses.
C. Achieving a Fossil Fuel Ban Through Constitutional
Amendment
Professor Lazarus has suggested that the severity of
economic adjustments to be wrought by effective mitigation of
climate change may require some form of pre-commitment
strategy to insulate greenhouse gas regulation from the
227. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see generally Jeffrey Kahn, International
Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271 (2008).
228. See PLATER, supra note 78, at 446–48.
229. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
230. Id. § 1536(e).
231. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
232. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149–50 (1914).
233. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, tit. II, § 6, 41 Stat. 305, 310
(1919).
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inevitable political backlash.234 One of the arguments of this
Article in favor of a simple ban on the sale and use of fossil
fuels is that it avoids the political and economic allocation
issues that are inevitable in a system of taxation, marketable
permits, or direct regulation. An outright ban on fossil fuels
would not require an independent agency to administer.
However, a legislatively or administratively imposed ban on
the sale or use of fossil fuels would still be subject to political
backlash and legislative reversal. It may be that the most
efficacious means of protecting a ban on fossil fuels from
legislative reversal would be a constitutional amendment
banning fossil fuels. Such an amendment would also resolve
potential challenges to federal authority to implement a ban.
While the likelihood of achieving the congressional resolution
and ratification by three fourths of the States may seem
fanciful in today’s political climate, the premise of this Article
is that the coming climate disaster will eventually become
sufficiently urgent that a political consensus in favor of a ban
on fossil fuels will become possible, just as the political
consensus in favor of strong action against water, land, and air
pollution developed in the 1970s.
As discussed in the next Part of this Article, there are
historical examples of social change movements achieving the
ultimate pre-commitment of constitutional amendment. The
ultimate success of the abolition movement in achieving the
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in the nineteenth
century is one example. Another example is the success of the
temperance movement in achieving ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment in the early twentieth century. The
very different experiences with these two constitutional
amendments may provide a useful frame to consider the
prospects for successful implementation of a fossil fuel ban.
V. MEETING THE SOCIAL-POLITICAL CHALLENGE OF A FOSSIL
FUEL BAN: THE NEW ABOLITIONISM MEETS THE OLD
ABOLITIONISM
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States to a
level that is consistent with avoiding catastrophic global
climate change will require fundamental changes in the U.S.
234. See Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1193.
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energy economy.235
Addressing climate change will also
require fundamental changes to individual personal choices
about where people live, work, play, and how they heat and
cool their homes.236 While efficiency and renewable energy
technologies may be able to carry us a long way towards
achieving the necessary independence from fossil fuels, full
achievement of this goal is inconsistent with current U.S.
energy consumption patterns under which many Americans
choose to live far from their jobs, drive to work in large singlepassenger vehicles, and fly long distances for recreational,
social, and business reasons.237
The working assumption among institutions, organizations,
and scholars is that the radical economic and social change
necessary to address global warming will be driven by law and
legal institutions.238 Much ink has been spilled discussing the
relative merits of a whole panoply of legal tools, ranging from
economic controls such as emissions trading regimes and
carbon taxes to traditional regulatory controls such as
emissions limits, to the extension of common law doctrines of
tort liability or public trust as a means of controlling
greenhouse gas emissions.239 The premise of the first half of
235.
Reducing
Greenhouse
Gas
Emissions,
EPA,
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ reducing-emissions.html [https://perma.cc/YUW4RZX7] (last visited May 15, 2016).
236.
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Transportation, EPA,
https://www3.epa.gov/
climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/transportation.html
[https://perma.cc/7T3Y-D62V] (last visited May 15, 2016).
237. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2014, at 68–69
(2014),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/219038.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
T3QM-TGV7].
238. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENVTL. PROGRAMME, THE ROLE OF LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS TO SUPPORT GREEN LOW-EMISSION AND CLIMATE RESILIENT
DEVELOPMENT
(2013),
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/publications/Role_Legal_Instruments_Climate_R
esilient.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9BC-3R9V] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016); Geoffrey Palmer,
The Implications of Climate Change for International Law and Institutions, 2
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 213 (1992); About the Center, SABIN CTR. FOR
CLIMATE
CHANGE
L.,
http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/about-center
[https://perma.cc/MSL9-HAED] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
239. See generally David Belis, Climate Finance in the European Union: Domestic
and International Challenges, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION LAW 509 (Geert Van Calster et al. eds., 2015); Maxine Burkett, Legal
Rights and Remedies, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 823 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012);
KEN COGHILL ET AL., FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 2 (2012); Darragh
Conway, Blazing Trail or Flickering Flame? Market Mechanisms Under the UNFCCC,
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this Article is that some sort of legal ban on fossil fuel use will
eventually be necessary. The working assumption behind
these discussions is that—properly implemented—legal change
is capable of prompting the sort of permanent social change
that will be required to address climate change.
This represents a tremendous national and global change in
economic and social arrangements to be achieved in a matter of
a few decades. The magnitude and abbreviated timeframe for
this necessary change would place it among such progressive
national transformations as the elimination of slavery, school
desegregation, gender and race equality, and prohibition. If
anything, the necessary time frame may be shorter than it took
to achieve, or partially achieve, these other progressive goals.
Under what circumstances can law reform achieve cultural
reform on this scale?
Law-driven social changes of this magnitude are not
unprecedented, but seem relatively few. Climate activists in
the United States consciously draw on the civil rights
movement of the 1960s in both their rhetoric and their tactics,
hoping to repeat the relatively successful social change
accomplished by 1960s civil rights legislation.240 However, the
civil rights struggle is not the only paradigm for fundamental
social and economic change driven by law. Other examples of
such fundamental change include abolition, prohibition, gender
equality, school desegregation, and to a lesser extent, the
twentieth century development of the administrative state, the
New Deal, and the 1970s environmental law revolution. At
least one of these social change initiatives (prohibition) was an
abject failure, another (abolition) was a complete success. The
others have had moderate—but incomplete—success at
achieving the degree of social restructuring.

in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION LAW, supra, at 425; Nidhi
Srivastava, Climate Change Mitigation in India, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION LAW, supra, at 634; THERESA M. THORP, CLIMATE JUSTICE: A
VOICE FOR THE FUTURE (2014).
240. See Mark Hertsgaard, The Making of a Climate Movement, NATION (Oct. 22,
2007), http://www.thenation.com/article/making-climate-movement/ [https://perma.cc/
W54N-7EGM]; Michael Svoboda, From Social Change to Climate Change: Lessons
from
the
1960s?,
YALE
CLIMATE
CONNECTIONS
(Jan.
9,
2014),
http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/ 2014/01/from-social-change-to-climate-changelessons-from-the-1960s/ [https://perma.cc/E2ZT-GDJR].
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While climate activism has begun to take on the mantle of
the “New Abolitionism,” climate activists and law reform
advocates have yet to adopt the implication of this sobriquet—
that the proper response to human induced climate change is a
total ban on the burning of fossil fuels.241 Rather, climate law
reform advocates argue for putting a price on carbon,
effectively converting the problem from one of moral and
ethical responsibility for destruction of the planetary ecosystem
to one of proper economic allocation of a limited resource.242 It
is the premise of this Article that such a ban is the logical and
rhetorically consistent response to human-induced climate
change, and that the abolition movement of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries provides the most promising analogue for
successful law-induced cultural reform.
Conversely,
prohibition serves as a cautionary example of a failed law
reform movement; the civil rights movement may be a flawed
analogue. In short, the climate movement (at least in the
United States) consciously models itself on the civil rights
movement, but bears some unfortunate similarities to the
temperance movement of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and needs to become more like the globally
successful movement for the abolition of slavery of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The mainstream U.S. environmental movement has yet to
confront the distributive justice problem inherent in an
allocation approach to a phaseout of carbon emissions.243
Achievement of a global middle class with a U.S. middle class
carbon footprint is utterly inconsistent with confining global
emissions to the 565 gigatons remaining. Yet a visit to the
websites of the national environmental organizations does not
reveal that any of these organizations are telling their
members or the public at large to be abandoning their gaspowered cars, moving out of their single-family houses, or even
eschewing air travel, as if the nation and the world can achieve
a carbon neutral energy future without all of these things

241. See Hayes, supra note 150.
242. The author admits to having espoused this view in the past. See Karl S.
Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A Sustainable
Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287 (2010).
243. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J.
1565 (2008).
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happening.244 Something has to give: either the hugely
disproportionate U.S. carbon footprint—even among the
constituents of environmental organizations—or aspirations for
a more equal global economic distribution.
It is not surprising that U.S. environmental organizations,
fearful of alienating their own membership, have chosen to
avoid taking a position on the global allocation of the 565
gigaton carbon increment or what that would mean for the
price of gasoline, airline tickets, and the lifestyles of their
members. This organizational behavior is consistent with what
some social scientists have described as the resource
mobilization model of social movements, in which social
movements act primarily to perpetuate themselves, much like
business firms, and frame issues and grievances in ways that
will not alienate their supporters.245
Existing technologies do exist to replace most, but not all, the
accoutrements of middle class life.246 However, these solutions
cost more than their fossil-powered equivalents and have not
been widely adopted—even among environmentalists.247
Carbon pricing mechanisms hope to achieve conversion to
renewables by driving up the price of carbon until renewable
energy alternatives enjoy a price advantage.248 Thus, the
unspoken premise behind carbon pricing strategies is to
achieve carbon neutrality by making a fossil-powered lifestyle
more expensive than its renewable alternative—not by making

244.
See generally CONSERVATION FUND, http://www.conservationfund.org
[https://perma.cc/QNZ6-U299]
(last
visited
Apr.
3,
2016);
GREENPEACE,
http://greenpeace.org [https://perma.cc/YBH5-563B] (last visited Apr. 3, 2016); SIERRA
CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org [https://perma.cc/ALJ6-FRLS] (last visited Apr. 3,
2016).
245. STEVEN M. BUECHLER, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THEORIES FROM
THE CLASSICAL ERA TO THE PRESENT 111 (2011).
246. HELEEN DE CONINCK & ROBERT BYRNE, LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY FOR THE
RISING
MIDDLE
CLASS
(2013),
http://climatestrategies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/Policy-Brief-Low-carbon-technology-for-the-rising-middleclass.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2RG-69HH].
247. KENNETH GILLINGHAM & JAMES SWEENEY, BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING LOW
CARBON TECHNOLOGIES (2012), http://web.stanford.edu/group/peec/cgi-bin/docs/policy/
research/Barriers%20to%20Implementing%20Low%20Carbon%20Technologies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VS2U-3YYS].
248. Kevin Kennedy et al., Putting a Price on Carbon: A Handbook for U.S.
Policymakers
2
(World
Res.
Inst.,
Working
Paper,
2015),
http://www.wri.org/sites/default/
files/carbonpricing_april_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DF85-FV7B].
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alternative fuels less expensive (though some mitigation
through economies of scale, subsidies, or technological
innovation are hoped for). While a zero carbon economy is
technically feasible, it will require a huge reallocation of
technology and an abandonment of investments in existing
carbon-dependent infrastructure: not just the fossil fuels that
must remain in the ground,249 but the automobiles, power
plants, planes, suburbs, houses, and highways that have been
built in reliance on their continued availability.250 Some
markers of middle class existence in the developed world—
large single family houses, single passenger cars, and cheap air
travel—may simply be unavailable in a zero carbon energy
economy.
Nor is there any visible global movement towards achieving
the necessary rate of carbon emissions. Allocation approaches
to limiting carbon emissions have failed to achieve the
necessary reductions where implemented251 and have failed
politically in the United States. Based on current trends,
limiting carbon emissions to 565 gigatons by mid-century
would seem to require implementation of a zero carbon global
energy economy by the year 2030, as the 565 gigaton increment
will be fully used up by then.252
A. Can Law Change Culture?
The underlying premise of much of the climate change debate
among legal scholars and economists is that as long as the
governing system of laws generates the appropriate legislative,
judicial, or regulatory set of rules, then the market and social
economies will come into line, conform, internalize the rules,

249. Hayes, supra note 150.
250. John H. Cushman, Jr., Is ‘Net-Zero’ Carbon Goal to Rescue the Climate
Plausible?, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 20, 2015), http://insideclimatenews.org/
news/20022015/net-zero-carbon-goal-rescue-climate-plausible [https://perma.cc/LN5RAJZN].
251. See Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Interactional International Law and
the Practice of Legality, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES 108, 124 (Emanuel Adler &
Vincent Pouliot eds., 2011) (stating the Kyoto Protocol’s targets were too modest to
achieve the necessary reductions).
252. Alex Morales, World Set to Exhaust 75% of Carbon Budget by 2030, UN Says,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-1030/world-set-to-exhaust-75-of-carbon-budget-by-2030-un-says [https://perma.cc/L94LTC5Y].
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and achieve the desired results.253 This breezy optimism about
the power of law reform to effect social and economic change is
not necessarily justified, as the three prime examples examined
in this Article illustrate. Law reform in these cases is just the
beginning—a tentative beginning—of social reform of this
magnitude.
Prohibition may well be the starkest example of law reform
that failed as social reform.254 But even the law reform
movement most generally hailed as a success—the civil rights
movement—is an incomplete success at best and has taken
over a generation to internalize. Just as Brown v. Board of
Education255 did not immediately (or ultimately) integrate
American public schools, the emancipation and equality
promises of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments have
taken generations to internalize.
Indeed, some legal scholars have questioned the efficacy of
legal change to accomplish progressive social change. Professor
Gerald Rosenberg argues that Brown did not prompt any of the
modest improvements in race relations and social integration
that followed from it: “In terms of judicial effects, then, Brown
and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts are
impotent to produce significant social reform.”256 Professor
Gerald Torres has similarly questioned whether law reform,
controlled by elites, is sufficient to accomplish social reform.257
Torres notes that the Brown decision, addressed to racial
classifications in education rather than equality of resources,
failed to achieve its promise of improved educational outcomes
due to white flight, tracking, and provocation of class anxieties
among the lower-income whites left in integrated school
systems.258 Torres argues for an expanded understanding of
the role of law in social change and inclusion of non-elites in
253. David Gelles, To Achieve Paris Climate Goals, U.S. Will Need New Laws, N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
19,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/business/energyenvironment/to-achieve-paris-climate-goals-us-will-need-new-laws.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/BG4Q-PMSD].
254.
The Temperance Movement and Prohibition, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/article-1G2-2587100023/temperance-movement-andprohibition.html [https://perma.cc/729Q-79DP] (last visited May 15, 2016).
255. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
256. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 71 (2d ed. 2008).
257. Gerald Torres, Legal Change, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 135, 140 (2007).
258. Id.
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this understanding, what he and Professor Lani Gunier have
dubbed “Demosprudence.”259 And Professor Thomas Stoddard
has similarly noted the potential disconnect between law
reform and social internalization of the reformed norms.260
Stoddard commented on the disconnect he observed between
the normative laws in New Zealand guaranteeing equal rights
regardless of sexual preference and the complete invisibility of
gays in New Zealand society.261 Stoddard thus points out the
distinction between “rule shifting” and “culture shifting.”262
Stoddard identifies four factors that must be present for rule
changing to effect culture change: “For ‘culture-shifting’ to
take place, all four factors must be engaged. The four factors
are these: (1) A change that is very broad or profound; (2)
Public awareness of that change; (3) A general sense of the
legitimacy (or validity) of the change; and (4) Overall,
continuous enforcement of the change.”263
These scholars recognize that legal change is just a part of
remedial societal change. As the failed example of prohibition
and the incomplete success of the civil rights reforms illustrate,
the relationship between law reform and the underlying social
movement is key to the success of remedial laws. Perhaps
Richard Kluger, in his history of the desegregation effort, put it
best:
But law, in a democracy, cannot impose that resolution by the
force of the state alone. Democracy is too unruly for that. That is
its great weapon against the would-be tyrant; that is the agony it
imposes on the most enlightened reformer. Law in a democracy
must contend with reality. It has to persuade. It has to induce
compliance by its appeal to shared human values and social
goals. How well law succeeds in winning, however reluctantly,
the abandonment of unjust private advantage is perhaps the
severest, and best, measure of that society’s humanity.264

259. Id. at 141.
260. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to
Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 974 (1997).
261. Id. at 972.
262. Id. at 977–78.
263. Id. at 978.
264. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 745 (2004).
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As Kluger points out, successful law reform “has to
persuade.”265 It must have a social component as well as a
political and legal component, thus the prospects for successful
law reform cannot be considered without reference to the larger
social movement of which that law reform is a part. Social
movements must convince a substantial portion of society of
the justness of their cause, and they must motivate individuals
to participate and identify with the movement.266
Issue
framing plays an important role in this process, and social and
legal reform movements depend heavily on identifying victims
of injustice and the villains causing that injustice to recruit
adherents to their cause.267 The nature of these victims and
villains may have some bearing on the ultimate success of the
reform movement.
B. Climate Activism in the United States: The Civil Rights
Model
While nearly all of the national environmental organizations
in the United States have active climate advocacy programs,
one organization, 350.org, has stepped forward as the leading
social activist group organized specifically around the climate
change issue. 350.org’s name refers to the number of parts per
million of CO2 the global atmosphere must be reduced to in
order to avoid catastrophic climate change.268 350.org has
explicitly adopted the mantle of the civil rights activists of the
1960s and the anti-apartheid South African divestment
activists of the 1970s and 1980s.269 Like the civil rights
movement, 350.org has deployed protest rallies and civil
disobedience to publicize its cause.270
Its more recent
campaigns have included a rally in Washington, D.C.,
culminating in a march on the White House to protest the
anticipated approval of the Keystone XL shale oil pipeline.271
265. Id.
266. BUECHLER, supra note 245, at 146.
267.
Id.; see, e.g., Eve Bratman, Villains, Victims, and Conservationists?
Representational Frameworks and Sustainable Development on the Transamazon
Highway, 39 HUM. ECOL. 441, 441–42 (2011).
268.
See
What
We
Do,
350.ORG,
http://350.org/about/what-we-do/
[https://perma.cc/A44Y-S7VD] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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Many protestors at this rally were arrested after refusing
orders to break up the unpermitted demonstration.272 Other
acts of civil disobedience have included trespassing on
mountaintop removal coal mine property in order to interfere
with coal mining operations.273
350.org’s most recent
campaign—”Fossil Free”—seeks to organize college students to
hold sit-ins in university offices to demand disinvestment of
endowments from fossil fuel industry investments.274 This
campaign is explicitly modeled on campus divestment
campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s as a protest against South
Africa’s apartheid policy.275
C. The Possible Climate Activism Analogues: Law Driven
Social Change Paradigms in the United States
Climate activists thus seek to take on the mantle of the
1960s civil rights activists and have adopted many of the civil
rights activists’ tactics. But the civil rights struggle of the
1960s is not the only analog for achieving social change
through activism for legal changes. Nor is it necessarily the
most apt analog. Practically from its birth as a nation, the
United States has spawned social activist movements, from the
abolitionist and temperance movements of the early nineteenth
century, through the prohibitionists and suffragists of the early
twentieth century, to the civil rights movement of the midtwentieth century, and the environmental movement of the
later twentieth century.
These activist movements have leveraged political activism
into legal change, which in turn implemented social and
economic reordering of a scale similar to those necessary to
272. Jamie Henn, KeystoneXL Protest at the White House Leads to Mass Arrests,
350.ORG (Mar. 2, 2014), http://350.org/press-release/keystone-xl-protest-at-the-whitehouse-leads-to-mass-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/VE7F-M5EA].
273. See 100 Arrested in Washington as Part of Appalachia Rising Mobilization,
350.ORG, http://350.org/100-arrested-washington-part-appalachia-rising-mobilization/
[https://perma.cc/5NC2-V3ZG] (last visited Mar. 5, 2016); Four Anti-Mountaintop
Removal Activists Arrested at Home, COAL IS DIRTY, http://www.coal-is-dirty.com/fouranti-mountaintop-removal-activists-arrested-home
[https://perma.cc/SH6A-WVKE]
(last visited May 15, 2016).
274.
About Fossil Free, FOSSIL FREE, http://gofossilfree.org/about-fossil-free/
[https://perma.cc/8Z4P-CD49] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
275. See Desmond Tutu Endorses Divestment Action at Harvard, 350.ORG (Mar. 3,
2015),
http://350.org/press-release/desmond-tutu-endorses-divestment-action-atharvard/ [https://perma.cc/5UCQ-NADM].
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respond to climate change. In each case, activists challenged
existing social and economic arrangements and relationships,
and in each case, defenders of the status quo made similar
arguments about the impracticality and social disruptiveness
of the changes demanded by the activists. These movements
have used various legal tools, ranging from legislative reform
to litigation to constitutional amendment, in order to achieve
their social and economic restructuring goals. The rhetoric
used by each of these social change movements echoes their
predecessors.
The following discussion investigates and
compares features of these social change efforts in order to
provide context for the current activism for the social change
necessary to address climate change.
The civil rights movement has served as the prototype for
every U.S. social movement since, and is the model consciously
adopted by climate change activists in the United States.276
Similarities and dissimilarities with this movement thus bear
examination. In addition, the temperance movement of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the abolition
movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are
comparable to the climate response movement in the scope of
economic and social readjustment they seek and their reliance
on law reform as their primary means of achieving this
adjustment.277 The successes and failures of these movements,
and the similarities and dissimilarities in their strategies and
tactics, may have a bearing on the prospects for a successful
law-mediated response to climate change.
1. Civil Rights and Racial Equality Movement
Since climate activists claim the mantle of the civil rights
marchers of the 1960s, it is worth examining the similarities
and differences between the climate movement and the civil
rights movement first.
Climate stabilization and racial
equality share some salient features—as with any social
change movement, the activists are pitted against existing
social and political institutions that seek to maintain existing
hierarchies and economic, social, and political arrangements.
276. THEODORE O. WINDT, JR., PRESIDENTS AND PROTESTERS: POLITICAL RHETORIC
163 (1990).
277. A comparison to other movements, such as women’s suffrage, the 1970s
environmental movement, and marriage equality, may also be instructive.
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Racial equality, like climate change, can be described as a
“wicked” problem—a problem that defies easy solution because
the problem’s nature cannot be fully defined without reference
to the solutions contemplated.278
Climate activists are also relying on the same legal tools as
the civil rights activists of the twentieth century. Just as
judicial dismantling of school segregation was the holy grail of
the NAACP when a legislative solution was politically
impossible, some contemporary climate activists (e.g., Our
Children’s Trust) are pressing litigation to invoke the public
trust doctrine to achieve judicially mandated imposition of
climate change solutions.279 Just as the civil rights activists of
the 1960s pressed—successfully—for national legislation
banning race discrimination in employment, education, and
places of public accommodation, contemporary climate activists
are pushing for comprehensive legislation limiting carbon
emissions to sustainable levels.
And, of course, climate
activists have adopted some of the social activism tools
deployed by the civil right activists of the 1960s, including
mass demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience.
Yet, despite these positive parallels, there are some
cautionary parallels and distinctions between the civil rights
movement and the climate stabilization movement. If the goal
of climate stabilization is a zero carbon energy and
transportation economy, then the civil rights movement may
not be the best model. The school desegregation decision and
the 1960s civil rights legislation succeeded in eliminating de
jure school segregation and much overt discrimination in
employment and places of public accommodation.280 But half a
century later, de facto school segregation persists, and social
and economic racial inequality continues.281 If the goal of
278. Lazarus, supra note 80, at 1159.
279.
2015
Federal
Lawsuit,
OUR
CHILDREN’S
TRUST,
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/us/federal-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/8V7M-R68N]
(last
visited Feb. 2, 2016).
280. See Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What a
Historical Juxtaposition of the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism
Has to Teach Environmentalists Today, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 292 (2001) (describing the
effects of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited segregation in public
accommodations, prohibited discrimination in employment, and symbolized “that the
nation as a whole would not tolerate such blatant, violent racism”).
281. See Sarah Childress, A Return to School Segregation in America?, PBS (July 2,
2014),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-return-to-school-segregation-in-
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climate stabilization activists is the achievement of a zero
carbon society within fifteen (or even fifty) years, then the civil
rights movement is an example of failure rather than success.
There is also some inconsonance between the civil rights
demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience of the 1960s and
those of contemporary climate activists.
Both use mass
protests and acts of civil disobedience to draw public attention
to their cause and demonstrate the depth of their own personal
commitment to the cause,282 but the organizers and
participants in the earliest civil rights demonstrations
consisted largely of the African American victims of racial
injustice in this country. The civil rights movement can justly
claim to have been a grievance-initiated rather than a resource
mobilization-initiated movement. To be sure, the civil rights
movement ultimately recruited northern middle class whites to
their cause,283 but this was only after the movement had
already achieved some of its most significant legal and social
victories, including Brown and the Montgomery bus boycott.
Climate activists have adopted the slogan “climate justice” in
support of their cause in recognition of the differential impacts
climate change will have on developing nations and
communities of color.284 But the victims of climate injustice are
by and large missing from the climate activists’
demonstrations. These victims tend to be geographically and
temporally remote from the U.S. climate activism community.
The People’s Climate March in New York City in September
2014 set aside over twenty-five city blocks for the staging of the
marchers, with barely four blocks set aside for the marchers
representing climate victim communities.285 If anything, the
america/ [https://perma.cc/Z4CY-CB8R] (“By 2011, the percentage of black students in
majority white schools was 23.2 percent—slightly lower than it was in 1968.”); Jolie
Lee, Still Apart: Map Shows States with Most-Segregated Schools, USA TODAY (May
15,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/05/15/schoolsegregation-civil-rights-project/9115823/ [https://perma.cc/3JSQ-E3XK] (citing racial
discrimination, movement of affluent families, and housing discrimination as factors
that contribute to continued segregation in schools).
282. Marilyn Sewell, Civil Disobedience and Climate Change, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marilyn-sewell/civic-disobedience-andcl_b_ 7935984.html [https://perma.cc/M56E-78GK].
283. DOUG MCADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER 37 (1988).
284.
Climate
Justice,
350.ORG,
http://350.org/category/topic/justice/
[https://perma.cc/HKN3-5BFG] (last visited May 15, 2016).
285.
The People’s Climate March Lineup, PEOPLE’S CLIMATE MARCH,
http://2014.peoplesclimate.org/lineup/ [https://perma.cc/WA6H-GKGS] (last visited Apr.
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marchers and protesters, consisting of those Americans who
can afford to fly to Washington, D.C. and New York City, are
more likely to be on the “giving” end of climate injustice than
on the receiving end. There is no small irony in the fact that
simply by flying to one of these protests and returning home,
many of the protesters have greatly exceeded that one-ton
annual per capita direct carbon footprint the world needs to
achieve. This lack of true climate victims among the marchers
not only makes for poor television, it dilutes the power of the
message compared to the civil rights marches of the 1960s.
The civil rights movement included clear victims and villains.
African Americans were being beaten, murdered, and arrested
simply for seeking to exercise the basic rights and enjoy the
basic equalities that are drawn into the nation’s founding
documents.286 The villains were the Southern police chiefs
siccing attack dogs on peaceful protestors, the lynch mobs
attacking the freedom riders, and the government officials who
refused to register eligible African Americans to vote.287 Not
only does the climate movement lack such clear individual
victims, it also lacks clear individual villains as well. Climate
activists have focused their attention on the fossil fuel industry
and cast that industry as the villain.288 This may be useful
framing for recruitment and motivation of its members, but it
lacks the visceral appeal of individual cruelty and violence
directed at the civil rights activists. And the climate activists’
choice to cast the fossil fuel industry as its villain suffers
ultimately from a problem of misdirection: it is not the
extraction and distribution of fossil fuels that is the primary
cause of climate change, it is the burning of those fuels. And
the people who burn those fuels are for the largest part the

3, 2016); see Ari Phillips, More than 310,000 People Descend on New York to March for
Climate Action, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/
climate/2014/09/21/ 3570150/peoples-climate-march/ [https://perma.cc/2PSP-KMJF].
286. Simone Sebastian, Don’t Criticize Black Lives Matter for Provoking Violence.
The Civil Rights Movement Did, Too, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2015/10/01/dont-criticize-blacklives-matter-for-provoking-violence-the-civil-rights-movement-did-too/
[https://perma.cc/4CKU-XMYM].
287. See SARA BULLARD, FREE AT LAST: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT AND THOSE WHO DIED IN THE STRUGGLE (1989).
288. Mike Gold, Climate Change Super Villains, RIVERDALE PRESS (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://riverdalepress.com/stories/Climate-change-super-villains,56073.
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very supporters of the climate justice movement, middle-class
Americans.
One can understand the movement’s choice not to cast its
own supporters as villains, but at some point issue framing
must confront issue reality, and full implementation of a
climate response will require social change even among the
liberal middle-class supporters of the climate movement, not
just on the part of Exxon Mobil. It is telling that the
Montgomery bus boycott required every African American in
Montgomery, Alabama to give up their usual mode of
commuting to work and to ride-share (and in many cases walk)
to work for an entire year.289 That the climate movement has
not yet asked such a sacrifice from its adherents indicates a
certain failure, to date, to internalize the true goals of the
movement and to identify the true cause of the climate
grievances.
The climate activists’ acts of civil disobedience also lack some
of the rhetorical force of those of the 1960s civil rights activists.
Pure civil disobedience involves a public violation of an unjust
law as a means of demonstrating the injustice of the law as
well as publicizing the injustice.290 When Rosa Parks refused
to surrender her bus seat to a white passenger, she was
arrested for violating the very segregation laws that she was
seeking to overturn.291 Similarly, the sit-ins at segregated
lunch counters were a protest against the use of trespass laws
to deprive African Americans of equal treatment at private
establishments open to the public.292 When a climate protester
is arrested for failing to disperse at an unpermitted
demonstration, it is not the laws regulating public
demonstrations that the activist is opposed to. The arrests still
help call attention to the activists’ cause—particularly when
the arrestees include leaders of the climate activism
community like James Hansen, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. (and his
289.
Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott, U.S. HIST.,
http://www.ushistory.org/ us/54b.asp [https://perma.cc/GAL2-UP93] (last visited May
16, 2016).
290. Civil Disobedience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/civil%20disobedience (last visited May 16, 2016).
291. Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott, supra note 289.
292.
Freedom
Struggle,
SMITHSONIAN
NAT’L
MUSEUM
A M.
HIST.,
http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/6-legacy/freedom-struggle-2.html
[https://perma.cc/M4WR-S6ES] (last visited May 16, 2016).
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son Conor), veteran civil rights leader Julian Bond, and the
President of the Sierra Club.293
But these acts of civil
disobedience lack the moral persuasion of an arrest for
violating a law that is itself patently unjust.
Climate activism consciously invokes the civil rights protests
of the 1960s. To be sure, there are parallels. But there are
also significant differences, which may make reliance on the
civil rights model of activism and legal change imperfectly
effective both politically and legally.
2. Prohibition
Many aspects of the climate stabilization battle call to mind
another, less flattering analogue—that of prohibition.
Prohibition should serve as a cautionary tale for the climate
response movement. As an unsuccessful example of lawmediated social change, climate law reformers should pay close
attention to the spectacular failure of prohibition. Yet there
are uncanny parallels between the temperance movement and
the current incarnation of climate activists in the United
States. These parallels include the casting of a powerful
consumer industry as the villain in the conflict, an evolution in
goals from moderation to an outright ban, similar political and
social mobilizing tactics, reliance on a precommitment strategy,
anti-libertarianism of the movement’s goals, the assault on a
consumer product in widespread use, the failure of many in the
movement to internalize the change sought by the movement,
and ultimately, the moralism underlying the movement.
a. Casting Industry as Villains
As noted above, the climate movement has chosen to cast the
fossil fuel industry, and its prominent individual titans, as the
villains in the conflict.294 The temperance movement similarly

293. See Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Arrested: Waterkeeper President Joins Others in
Climate Change Rally Outside White House, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/13/robert-f-kennedy-jrarrested_n_2679609.html [https://perma.cc/H985-YGV5]; Top NASA Scientist Arrested
(Again)
in
White
House
Protest,
FOX
NEWS
(Feb.
13,
2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/science/2013/02/13/top-nasa-climate-scientist-arrested-againin-white-house-protest.html [https://perma.cc/WUM4-ACM6].
294. Gold, supra note 288.
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cast the brewing and saloon industry as its villains.295 In both
cases, a consumer industry is cast as greedy and corrupt,
acting without heed to the damage and destruction its practices
are causing. In both cases, the industry is accused (with some
justice) of having subverted the democratic political system.
The rhetorical parallels are at times uncanny. Norman
Clark, a historian sympathetic to the temperance movement,
described the movement’s characterization of the liquor
industry in the following terms:
At every level of municipal or state responsibility, the liquor
interests polluted politics . . . .
They repeatedly financed
campaigns in opposition to women’s suffrage, and they did their
best—and performed at their worst—in perverting democratic
practice in the many state and local referenda on the question of
licensing saloons.296

Temperance advocate Reverend Mark Matthews similarly
(and contemporaneously) described the liquor industry as
the most fiendish, corrupt, and hell-soaked institution that
ever crawled out of the slime of the eternal pit. . . . [Congress]
has been dominated by the liquor interests for the last fortytwo years, and the two great political parties are rum-soaked,
saloon cursed, and without conscience on the abolition of this
great enemy.297
Current day descriptions of the fossil fuel industry echo these
characterizations.
Bill McKibben echoes the eighteenth
century temperance advocates in his description of the fossil
fuel industry:
These companies are a rogue force. They are outlaws. They are
not outlaws against the law of the state, they get to write those
for the most part. But they are outlaws against the laws of
physics. If they carry out their business plan, the planet
tanks . . . . The thing that is holding us back above all else is the

295. Roots of Prohibition, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/roots-ofprohibition/ [https://perma.cc/JE9B-QCSP] (last visited May 16, 2016).
296. NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN PROHIBITION 4–5 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1976).
297. DALE E. SODEN, THE REVEREND MARK MATTHEWS: AN ACTIVIST IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 94–95 (U. of Wash. Press, 2001).
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simple fact that the fossil fuel industry cheats. Alone among
industries they are allowed to pour out their wastes for free.298

Activist Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. describes the industry in
similar terms of political corruption:
“They have so rigged the system that we cannot go to court. The
oil industry has turned Congress into indentured servants. Even
Obama in his State of the Union has to doff his cap to big oil and
genuflect to them.”299

These parallel vilifications of industry are important because
in both cases, the movement chooses to identify the industry
purveyors of a product as the source of the externalities
associated with its use by the consumer. Put simply, brewing
beer and distilling liquor does not destroy families any more
than pumping oil out of the ground causes climate change. In
both cases, the externalities that social change movements seek
to address are caused by the consumption, not the production,
of the product in question. But from a resource mobilization
and framing perspective, vilifying the industry that provides
the offensive product is more effective, at least in the short
term.
In addition to casting the industry itself as the villain, both
movements have identified industry leaders for particular
demonization. In the case of the temperance movement, the
individual villains were the patriarchs of German-American
brewing families, including Adolphus Busch. Indeed, antiGerman sentiment during World War I has been identified as a
factor giving national prohibition the political boost it needed
to become a constitutional amendment.300 In the modern day
case of climate activists, the individual villains are the Koch
brothers, oil industry magnates whose anti-environmental
298.
See 350.org, Do the Math—The Movie, YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuCGVwJIRd0 (quoting Bill McKibben at
00:14:20).
299.
Interview with Robert F. Kennedy Jr., ABC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=7400698&page=1
[https://perma.cc/DA6HRRHG].
300. See Thomas Welskopp, Prohibition in the United States: The GermanAmerican Experience, 1919–1933, 53 BULL. GHI 31, 32 (2013), http://www.ghidc.org/files/publications/bulletin/
bu053/bu53_031.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FYK-7PTZ].
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political donations and support for climate-denier foundations
have earned them the special scorn of the climate movement.301
b. Evolution from Moderation to Prohibition, and from
State-Level Response to Federal
As its name implies, the temperance movement started out
as a movement seeking moderation, not complete abstinence, in
the consumption of alcoholic beverages. It was only after
moderation-directed “temperance” efforts failed to effect
meaningful changes in behavior did the movement adopt
prohibition as its goal.302 Climate activism is in the process of
undergoing a similar conversion, turning from advocacy of
market based and rationing-style controls on fossil fuels, as
advocated by mainstream environmental organizations, to the
unstated goal of abolition of fossil fuels implicit in Bill
McKibben’s argument that fossil fuel reserves beyond the 565
gigaton increment be left in the ground.303 Although 350.org
currently advocates simply for divestment from fossil fuel
industry investments rather than a ban on fossil fuels,
commentators have begun to recognize that McKibben’s
argument is an implicit call for fossil fuel abolition.304
There is also a parallel evolution from state-level to federallevel responses. Thwarted politically at the federal level,
temperance advocates succeeded in turning many states dry.
With the failure of the 2009 Climate Bill,305 climate advocates
have had more success at the state level with the
implementation of regional state greenhouse gas emissions
trading programs, such as the Northeast’s Regional Greenhous
Gas Initiative as well as California’s adoption of comprehensive
legislation seeking to achieve a fifteen percent reduction in

301. See, e.g., Eric Holthaus, Researchers: Exxon, Koch Family Have Powered the
Climate-Denial Machine for Decades, SLATE (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
future_tense/2015/12/01/exxonmobil_koch_family_have_powered_climate_change_deni
al_for_decades.html [https://perma.cc/AT3J-332D].
302. JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 7 (2d ed. 1986).
303.
Do
the
Math:
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
350.ORG,
http://math.350.org/questions/ [https://perma.cc/J9RQ-E36Y] (last visited May 16,
2016).
304. Hayes, supra note 150.
305. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
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state-wide carbon emissions by 2020.306 Temperance advocates
turned their attention back to the national stage when the
Supreme Court held that state bans on importation of alcohol
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.307 Ironically, some
aspects of California’s renewable energy plan, as well as the
renewable energy requirements in some of the regional
greenhouse gas control alliances, have now been challenged on
the grounds they violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.308
c. Political Tactics
Although climate activists’ tactics may seem to be inspired by
the civil rights movement, those tactics themselves echoed
many of the tactics adopted to great success by the temperance
and suffrage movements of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Long before the 1963 Civil Rights March
on Washington, D.C., there was the 1913 Temperance March
on Washington, D.C.309 The temperance movement had its
political arms, including the National Prohibition Party as well
as strategic candidate endorsements and lobbying efforts.310
The temperance movement also had its moments of directaction civil disobedience. The Women’s Anti-Saloon League
blockaded saloons that were operating legally, while Carrie
Nation later made a career of “hatchetizing” saloons operating
illegally in violation of state anti-saloon laws.311 These acts of

306. Global Warming Solution Act, A.B. 32, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified
at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 (West 2016)); see REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/ [https://perma.cc/PF67-DPA4] (last visited Apr. 3,
2016).
307. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
308. See Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011); see
also Glen C. Hansen, The Commerce Clause as a Sword to Challenge California’s
Efforts to Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ABBOTT & KINDERMANN LAND USE L. BLOG
(July 31, 2012), http://blog.aklandlaw.com/2012/07/articles/air-quality/the-commerceclause-as-a-sword-to-challenge-californias-efforts-to-curb-greenhouse-gas-emissions/
[https://perma.cc/RK36-YRTF].
309.
See The March to National Prohibition, WESTERVILLE PUB. LIBR.,
http://www.westervillelibrary.org/antisaloon-national-prohibition-march
[https://perma.cc/WPM5-2636] (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
310. Temperance Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/
topic/temperance_movements.aspx [https://perma.cc/G5ZV-3E4V] (last visited May 29,
2016).
311. See, e.g., Carry Nation Smashes Bar, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/carry-nation-smashes-bar [https://perma.cc/7797-Z2HW] (last visited
Mar. 13, 2016).
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civil disobedience have echoes in the modern day climate
activists chaining themselves to the White House fence to
protest the Keystone XL Pipeline and to more direct action
activists who chain themselves to mountaintop removal coal
mining equipment.312
Beyond these more common forms of public advocacy, the
climate movement echoes the temperance movement in its use
of science and public education as well. Temperance advocates
relied on a developing scientific consensus that alcohol was an
addictive drug with no medicinal properties,313 just as climate
activists rely on the global scientific consensus that
anthropogenic carbon emissions will cause a catastrophic
change in the global climate. Temperance advocates succeeded
in incorporating anti-alcohol education in the public school
curriculum,314 just as today’s climate activists struggle to
ensure that public schools teach the scientific consensus
concerning anthropogenic climate change.315
d. Pre-Commitment Strategy
Anticipating political resistance in implementation, the
temperance movement adopted the ultimate pre-commitment
strategy: a constitutional amendment prohibiting the sale or
use of intoxicating liquor.316 The solution to climate change
may well require some super-legislative legal change to
implement, such as a constitutional amendment or
international treaty.317 Climate legislation can be undone as
soon as the painful social adjustments begin to kick in, just like
312. See supra notes 270–273 and accompanying text.
313. Jack S. Blocker, Jr., Did Prohibition Really Work? Alcohol Prohibition as a
Public Health Innovation, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 233, 234 (2006) (noting that at one
point every State required schools to include “Scientific Temperance Instruction” in
their curriculum, even though teachers doubted the “scientific” nature of the
materials).
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., Joy Resmovits, Portland Schools Tried to Change How They Teach
Climate Change—and Ignited a Firestorm, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/
local/education/la-na-portland-schools-climate-change20160524-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/JMH5-J4YJ] (reporting that a school
district’s attempt to update its textbooks to align with modern science was politicized
and even characterized as a book ban).
316. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
317. Recall that Professor Richard Lazarus has argued that climate stabilization
remedies must be made immune from the usual legislative processes of amendment
and repeal. See Lazarus, supra note 80.

2016

Fossil Fuel Abolition

291

early attempts at prohibition accomplished at the legislative
level were soon undone. Prohibition was ultimately imposed
through constitutional amendment.
e. Anti-Libertarianism
Both prohibition of alcoholic beverages and a probable
prohibition on the burning of fossil fuels are anti-libertarian;
that is, they both profoundly limit freedom of individual action
in modern society. Prohibition limits the freedom to choose to
imbibe intoxicating liquors, a ban on fossil fuels would limit the
unfettered freedom of movement and of travel that is made
possible by cheap energy in the form of fossil fuels. Both
activities have come to have profound significance for selfdefinition and autonomy—and alcohol had done so by the time
that prohibition was adopted.
The parallels between intoxication and fossil fuels may run
deeper than is first apparent, especially when one considers
that the American car culture in its current form is almost
entirely dependent on cheap and freely available fossil fuels.
Alcohol’s attraction has always included its ability to induce
feelings of power, invulnerability, and control318—exactly the
same feelings induced by driving an automobile.319 “Being in
the driver’s seat” is more than a metaphor; it is a statement of
cultural values, and one that is not satisfied by public
transportation or car pools. A century of advertising has
infused
American
individuality,
self-definition,
class
identification, and personal autonomy with one’s choice of
automobile.320 Western culture may not give this autonomy up
any more easily than it was willing to give up the feelings of
power and control, however illusory, that come with alcohol.
318. CLARK, supra note 296, at 60.
319. See generally SARAH REDSHAW, IN THE COMPANY OF CARS: DRIVING AS A
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL PRACTICE 11, 69–70, 89–92 (2008); see also Emotion Detectors
Studied
to
Make
Driving
Safer,
AUTOINSURANCE
CTR.,
http://www.autoinsurancecenter.com/emotion-detectors-studied-to-make-drivingsafer.htm [https://perma.cc/A43Z-M8YF] (last visited Feb. 2, 2016) (describing
“intoxicating” feelings of “power” and “invincibility” when an angry driver gets behind
the wheel).
320. See JANE MOECKLI & JOHN D. LEE, THE MAKING OF DRIVING CULTURES 59
(2007),
https://www.aaafoundation.org/sites/default/files/MoeckliLee.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8QN-5BAX] (“[T]he car and driving have always referenced the
American experience of and desire for freedom, individualism, self-realization,
prosperity, and progress.”).
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Of course, libertarian ideals recognize that personal liberty
must have a limit when personal choices cause harm to other
people.321
The externalities of fossil fuel consumption
undoubtedly justify restrictions on their use in the classic
libertarian sense—but they may not in the American cultural
tradition of libertarianism. Alcohol also had—and continues to
have—its externalities.
Temperance advocates sought to
address the very real externalities of liquor consumption in the
form of destroyed lives and working class families deprived of
their needed income.
Alcohol continues to kill 88,000
Americans each year.322
Even if climate change causes
Hurricane Katrina-scale events to be an annual occurrence
starting in 2050 (and no climate scientist is making such a
prediction), a hundred times more Americans will die from the
effects of alcohol consumption than will be killed by climate
change through 2100 (this does not consider, of course,
geographically remote populations that are more likely to
suffer the most severe impacts of climate change).323 The
judgment that one externality justifies autonomy limits while
the other does not reflects an implicit value judgment about the
worth of the autonomy interest at stake compared to the
externalities involved.
Although some defenders of segregation couched their
arguments in terms of individual liberty and freedom of
association,324 the civil rights movement did not seek to limit
freedom of individual private action in nearly so fundamental a
way.

321. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 144–45 (Harvard Press, 1863).
322.
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ALCOHOL USE AND YOUR HEALTH,
http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/pdfs/alcoholyourhealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUW9-5V9M]
(last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
323. IFAD & THE GLOBAL MECHANISM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
ASIA/PACIFIC REGION 1 (2009), http://www.ifad.org/events/apr09/impact/pacific.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XD6-TJHS]; J. Maarten Troost, Kiribati Faces Its Future, and a
Rising
Ocean,
L.A.
TIMES
(Nov.
13,
2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/
2013/nov/13/opinion/la-oe-troost-climate-change-kiribati-20131113
[https://perma.cc/4SQ8-ZYL4]; Jane Addison, Impact of Climate Change on Health and
Wellbeing in Remote Australian Communities: A Review of Literature and Scoping of
Adaptation Options 10 (Coop. Research Ctr. for Remote Econ. Participation, Working
Paper
No.
CW014,
2013),
http://www.crc-rep.com.au/resource/CW014_
ImpactClimateChangeHealthWellbeing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GSS-KE4R].
324. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).

2016

Fossil Fuel Abolition

293

f. Assault on a Ubiquitous Consumer Product
Implicit in the previous discussion of autonomy and liberty
interests, both the temperance movement and the climate
movement attack the use of a consumer product in widespread
use throughout society. This was not the case in the civil
rights movement.
g. Failure to Internalize the Social Change Goals
There is an inherent contradiction between the climate
movement’s implicit goal to ban fossil fuel consumption and its
organization of rallies and marches that depend on fossil fuel
consumption to bring its adherents together. The temperance
movement shared this contradiction—albeit to a much lesser
extent—as many of its adherents were drinkers. To be sure,
the temperance movement included a large proportion of
moralistic teetotalers, but some supporters of prohibition were
themselves drinkers. As historian Norman H. Clark wrote of
the author Jack London:
Yet Jack London, like many other drinkers of heroic capacities,
poured himself still another glass while musing over his
dedicated support of Prohibition. He did not find his support
either awkward or dishonest.325

American climate activists similarly see nothing dishonest or
awkward about burning fossil fuels at an unsustainable rate in
order to maintain their lifestyle and carry out their protest
activities.326
Some, like alcoholic prohibitionists seeking
government help to cure their own alcoholism, may consciously
be seeking government regulation to limit their own ability to
make choices that, collectively, are destructive to the global
ecosystem. Others, like those upper-class prohibitionists who
supported prohibition as a means to avoid the socially
destructive effects of alcohol on the working class but had every
intention on maintaining their own personal wine cellars, may
believe that effective climate change regulation will not limit
their own lifestyle choices. Indeed, the language of the

325. CLARK, supra note 296, at 1.
326.
Bill McKibben, A Moral Atmosphere, ORION MAG. (Mar. 28, 2013),
https://orionmagazine.org/article/a-moral-atmosphere/ [https://perma.cc/4VL6-4CQ8].
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Eighteenth
Amendment’s
prohibition
of
“intoxicating
beverages” left some ambiguity about whether that term would
be applied to beer and wine as well as distilled liquors.327 Some
supporters of prohibition may, indeed, have been surprised to
learn that it limited their own glass of wine with dinner.
Regardless, the failure of the climate movement to date to
internalize its own message about the immorality of burning
fossil fuels and the absolute necessity to end the practice
should be a warning sign for successful cultural
implementation of a legal response to climate change. Unlike
the temperance movement, there is no mainstream climate
advocate who has completely foresworn the use of fossil
fuels.328 If the temperance movement was unable to gain
cultural acceptance of prohibition despite the positive example
of legions of teetotalers, there is little reason to expect climate
activists to gain cultural acceptance for a ban on fossil fuels.
h. Moral Underpinnings of the Movement
Sociologist Joseph Grusfield’s study of the temperance
movement characterized the movement as a values and statusoriented movement rather than a grievance-prompted
movement.329 That is, temperance advocates consisted of
middle-class Protestants who saw their status and Victorian
family values as threatened by the urban immigrant labor who
frequented the saloons.330
These white, middle-class
Protestants saw hard work, devotion to family, and sobriety as
moral imperatives and reacted to the waning social
commitment to abstinence from alcohol as a marker of
status.331 Thus, prohibition was an attempt to use the legal
and political process to impose one set of lifestyle and family
values on the larger population and thus contained the seeds of
its own failure.332

327. CLARK, supra note 296, at 9.
328. Sociologist Clare Saunders, Environmental Networks and Social Movement
Theory, has identified some countercultural environmental communities in London
that foreswear use of automobiles. See generally CLARE SAUNDERS, ENVIRONMENTAL
NETWORKS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY (2013).
329. See GUSFIELD, supra note 302.
330 Id. at 98–100, 105–06, 124.
331 Id. at 125–26.
332 Id. at 110, 111–38.
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As suggested above, the lack of true climate victims among
the leadership (and by and large even the membership) of the
climate activist movement may render it susceptible to a
similar characterization as a values-oriented movement rather
than a grievance-oriented movement.333 Indeed, the climate
policy debate in the United States has become inextricably
intertwined with the so-called “culture wars” between the right
and the left.
One need not credit the climate-denier’s claim that climate
science is an elaborate hoax dreamed up by a liberal cabal in
order to impose its communitarian vision on the rest of society
to inquire into the extent to which the framing of the climate
issue by activist organizations reflects its own sense of cultural
values. Certainly, environmentalism in general, and climate
activism in particular, reflect a set of moral and cultural values
that cannot be defended on pure utilitarian grounds alone,
such as the value of leaving natural habitats (including the
global climate ecosystem) undisturbed, or the value of
preserving the current ecosystem balance for future
generations. Climate activism runs some risk of becoming a
values-oriented movement (and perhaps suffering the same
fate as prohibition) to the extent that it strays from the pure
scientific equivalence of carbon emissions.
Look at the
websites of any of the mainstream environmental organizations
and you will see exhortations to take public transportation to
work, buy more fuel efficient cars, and increase the efficiency of
home heating and cooling, but none of them will tell you to
avoid discretionary air travel,334 even though personal air
333. Many sociologists disagree that there are any truly grievance-oriented social
movements, and see the twentieth century rise of social movements in Western
democracies as a reflection of the increased leisure and resources available to a middle
class that is not generally among the aggrieved members of society. See generally
BUECHLER, supra note 245.
334. See Kristin Eberhard, What You Can Do to Reduce Your Carbon Footprint,
SWITCHBOARD
(Apr.
29,
2013),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kgrenfell/
what_you_can_do_to_reduce_your.html [https://perma.cc/F6EL-LFSM]; Bob Schildgen,
Hey Mr. Green, What Should My Carbon-Footprint Goal Be?, SIERRA MAG. (June 10,
2015),
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2015-4-july-august/green-life/hey-mr-greenwhat-should-my-carbon-footprint-goal-be [https://perma.cc/5C9J-GBA5] (suggesting
that we offset air travel rather than reduce air travel, and not suggesting offsets
instead of other reductions); Komal Singh, 10 Simple Things to Reduce Your Carbon
Footprint This 2014, GREENPEACE COMMUNITY BLOGS (Dec. 22, 2013),
http://www.greenpeace.org/india/en/Blog/Community_blogs1/10-simple-things-to-do-toreduce-your-carbon-/blog/47775/ [https://perma.cc/Q8QA-K28Y].
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travel is likely by far the largest single component of the
individual carbon footprint of most upper middle-class
Americans who form the basic constituency of the
environmental movement.335
To the extent that this particular framing of the climate issue
reflects underlying cultural values—large cars are bad and
unnecessary, while air travel is a form of personal and cultural
enrichment and is a good thing, despite equal carbon impacts—
the climate movement runs some risk, ultimately, of suffering
the same fate as prohibition.
These factors, unfortunately, seem to place the climate
movement, at least in its current form, closer to the
temperance movement in terms of its tactics, framing, and
socio-political basis. This leads to the question whether there
are other legal reform social movements that might provide a
more positive example for the climate movement. A relatively
hopeful analogy may be present in the abolitionist movement
originating in the United Kingdom in the eighteenth century,
and ultimately spreading to the United States and the rest of
the globe.
3. Abolition
If the scientific determination that 565 gigatons of carbon
dioxide emissions between now and 2050 is an absolute limit to
keep climate change to tolerable levels, then something like an
effective, absolute, and fully enforced prohibition on burning
fossil fuels would be necessary. Prohibition was neither
effective in eliminating alcohol consumption in the United
States nor was it effective in maintaining sufficient political
support to persist. As noted, the civil rights movement has
fallen far short of achieving full integration and racial equality
in the United States, despite its great legislative and litigation
achievements. As the health of the global ecosystem depends
on a completely successful political and legal implementation of
controls on fossil fuels, we must search for an example of lawdriven social change that was completely successful in
achieving its goal. The only U.S. example that comes to mind
is abolition. Unlike the temporary and partial success of
335. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Your Biggest Carbon Sin May Be Air Travel,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/sunday-review/thebiggest-carbon-sin-air-travel.html [https://perma.cc/X23S-3SCU].
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prohibition and the unfinished successes of the civil rights
movement, slavery has been (all but) completely and
permanently abolished in the United States. And, as the
response to climate change must be, the abolition of slavery—
more properly termed emancipation—was an international
effort. Indeed, examination of abolition as a social movement
must necessarily focus on the British abolition efforts of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Great Britain was the
leader in abolition, both socially and legally.336
There is growing recognition in the public press of the
parallels to be drawn between ending our reliance on fossil
fuels and ending the world’s economic reliance on slave labor
until the mid-nineteenth century. Commentators such as
George Monbiot337 and Christopher Hayes338 have noted the
fact that the Industrial Revolution directly substituted fossil
fuels for the work done largely by human slave labor prior to
the invention of the steam engine. By comparing climate
activism to the abolition of slavery, I by no means wish to draw
a moral equivalence between slavery and the burning of fossil
fuels. They are simply not moral equivalents. But there may
be some moral parallels between enjoying the fruits of slave
labor (without being a slaveholder) and enjoying the benefits of
a fossil fueled economy without regard to the human
consequences of that energy economy. And a slave economy’s
reliance on practically costless human labor (with abject
disregard for its human consequences) has obvious parallels to
the Industrial Revolution and the substitution of fossil fuel
powered machinery for human labor, with a similar disregard
for the ultimate consequences to the global ecosystem. Climate
scientist and activist James Hansen has himself called the
climate crisis a moral issue on a par with slavery.339
There are several important structural, organizational, and
rhetorical parallels between the historical international
abolition project and the fossil fuel elimination project that
336.
See John Oldfield, British Anti-Slavery, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
history/british/empire_seapower/antislavery_01.shtml [https://perma.cc/SDY6-JFUH]
(last updated Feb. 17, 2011).
337. MONBIOT, supra note 12, at 61.
338. Hayes, supra note 150.
339. Severin Carrell, Nasa Scientist: Climate Change Is a Moral Issue on a Par
with Slavery, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2012/apr/06/nasa-scientist-climate-change [https://perma.cc/69Z5-7K34].
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make emancipation an instructive analogy for successful lawmediated social change. These include the widespread cultural
acceptance of the practice challenged, the economic nature of
the practice challenged, the relation of abolition to
international mercantilism, the global nature of the abolition
effort, the evolution of the abolitionism from abolition to
emancipation, rhetorical similarities in challengers and
defenders of the institution challenged, and the parallel legal
and social organizing efforts that may be the true antecedents
of the 1960s civil rights movement.
a. Cultural Acceptance of Slavery and Fossil Fuels
Until the abolition movements of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, slavery was an accepted cultural norm
throughout the world, across nations and cultures. It was not
until the colonial era that Northern Europe became a small
enclave of non-slavery, even while slavery was tolerated in
European colonies.340 Similarly, fossil fuel consumption has
been a culturally accepted basis for economic activity since the
burning of coal commenced in the 1700s.341
As Christopher Hayes and others have noted, fossil fuels
literally power the global economy, as slaves did in preindustrial times.342 Like slaves, fossil fuel reserves have been
capitalized and form a significant portion of global wealth.343
b. Relation to Mercantilism and Need for International
Solution
Eighteenth century slavery became the workforce for tropical
sugar plantations, and the institution came to be justified on
the asserted grounds that only coerced (and African) labor was
capable of production in the harsh tropical climates suitable for
sugar cane production.344 Although free labor advocates—
including Adam Smith—argued that free labor must
340.
Slavery in History, FREE SLAVES, http://www.freetheslaves.net/aboutslavery/slavery-in-history/ [https://perma.cc/FC9C-S7UT] (last visited May 29, 2016).
341.
A
Brief
History
of
Coal
Use,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY,
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/
education/energylessons/coal/coal_history.html
[https://perma.cc/S5QT-JPT4] (last updated Feb. 12, 2013).
342. Hayes, supra note 150.
343. See id.
344. SEYMOUR DRESCHER, ABOLITION: A HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY
80–81 (2009).
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necessarily be more efficient than slaves, the U.K. found that
its free colonies could not compete with slave colonies.345 Thus,
emancipation—like reliance on renewable energy today—is
seen as putting mercantilist economies at a competitive
disadvantage in world markets. The elimination of slavery
thus became an international project, and as the U.K. moved
towards emancipation, first by banning the slave trade,
internationalization of the ban became a key part of British
foreign policy. Indeed, the British treaty with Spain in 1817
included provisions allowing the U.K. to board Spanish flagged
vessels to ensure they were not slave trading and established
the first supranational claims tribunals to address claims of
improper seizures.346
A response to climate change will similarly demand an
international response, obviously not just for the mercantilist
reasons that drove the internationalization of abolition, but for
the global nature of the ecological challenge. No mitigation of
climate change is possible without cooperation of all of the
world’s developed, industrialized nations.
c. Evolution from Abolition to Emancipation
Just as the temperance movement evolved from seeking
moderation to seeking prohibition in alcohol consumption, and
just as the climate movement must evolve from seeking
moderation in fossil fuel consumption to an absolute ban, the
abolition movement evolved from seeking a ban on the slave
trade to seeking emancipation and termination of the
institution of slavery. The British abolition movement started
as a movement for the abolition of the African slave trade.
Wilberforce’s entreaties to Parliament were careful to
distinguish “abolition”—which was limited to abolition of the
slave trade—from emancipation.347 The latter was considered
too radical, and too threatening to Britain’s colonial planter
class, who feared retribution by freed slaves.348 The climate
movement has similarly started with relatively modest goals—
345. Spencer J. Pack, Slavery, Adam Smith’s Economic Hand and the Invisible
Hand, 4 HIST. ECON. IDEAS 253, 255 (1996).
346. HERBERT S. KLEIN, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 193 (2d ed. 2010).
347. WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, AN APPEAL TO THE RELIGION, JUSTICE, AND HUMANITY
OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 35 (1823).
348. Id. at 24–29.
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disinvestment or carbon pricing—but must eventually adopt
complete cessation of fossil fuel consumption.
d. Rhetorical Parallels in the Climate and Slavery Debates
The public debates about abolition of slavery and abolition of
fossil fuels are carried out in remarkably similar terms. For
the abolitionist’s part, both slavery abolitionists and fossil fuel
abolitionists argue that the challenged institution is in fact
economically inefficient. As noted, free labor advocates argued
that free labor must necessarily be more efficient than coerced
labor.349 This argument is echoed by modern day climate
advocates who argue that renewable energy would be cheaper
than fossil fuels if fossil fuels were denied the government
subsidies implicit in national defense, extraction leases, tax
subsidies,
and
exemption
from
compensating
for
externalities.350 Both are making free market claims, with an
implicit argument that only a market failure allows the
existing, destructive economic practices to continue.
The rhetorical parallels among defenders of the status quo
are even starker: both slavery and fossil fuels have been
defended as nationally and globally necessary to support a
minimum standard of living. Consider this statement by
Exxon Mobil CEO Rex Tillerson:
We do not have a readily available replacement for the energy
that provides the means of living that the world has today—our
standard of living, but equally and perhaps more important, the
2 billion people on the planet that live below anything that we
would find acceptable . . . . We do not see a viable pathway, any
known technology today, to achieve the 350 outcome that is not
devastating to economies, societies, and people’s health and
welfare around the world.351

349. Supra note 345 and accompanying text.
350. See generally CAROLYN FISCHER & LOUIS PREONAS, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE, DP 10-19, COMBINING POLICIES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY: IS THE WHOLE LESS
THAN
THE
SUM
OF
ITS
PARTS?
(2010),
http://www.rff.org/files/
sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-10-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/E273-KEXG].
351. Robert Bradley Jr., Rex Tillerson (Exxon Mobil) on Climate Change
(Energy/Climate Realism Trumps Alarmism), MASTERRESOURCE (June 4, 2013),
https://www.masterresource.org/exxon-mobil/exxon-mobil-trumps-alarmists/
[https://perma.cc/MP27-RF9T].
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This defense of fossil fuels echoes nineteenth century defense
of slavery by Edmund Ruffin:
The introduction and establishment of domestic slavery is
necessarily an improvement of the condition and wealth and
well-being of the community in general, and also of the comfort of
the enslaved class . . . and is beneficial in every such case to the
master class, and to the community in general.352

There may also be some parallels between the epistemic
closure of Southern intellectuals in the nineteenth century and
the epistemic closure of modern-day U.S. conservatives and
some Southern States on the issue of climate change. Kenneth
Stampp’s history of slavery in the American South, The
Peculiar Institution, notes that in antebellum Southern States,
there was a social more that precluded intellectual discussion
critical of the institution of slavery, and these same States
adopted laws banning the advocacy of abolition.353
This
epistemic closure has been echoed in recent years on the issue
of climate change, as rejection of climate science became an
essential credential of conservative intellectual discussion,354
and some States have adopted laws banning the teaching of
climate science355 as well as the consideration of climate science
in public policy making.356
e. Social Movement Parallels
Each generation seems to think that it invented the modern
social movement, and social movement history starts with
nineteenth century political economists such as Marx and
Weber.357 Late twentieth century social movements are all
352. EDMUND RUFFIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY 3–4 (1853).
353. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 211 (1956).
354. Jim Manzi & Peter Wehner, Conservatives and Climate Change, 24 NAT’L AFF.
115 (2015).
355. Tanya Lewis, Florida Isn’t the Only State to ‘Ban’ Climate Change, LIVE SCI.
(Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.livescience.com/50085-states-outlaw-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/32DM-YQZA].
356. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-107.1 (2015); H.B. 819, 2011 Gen. Assemb. (N.C.
2012); see also Bruce Siceloff, While the Seas Rise in the Outer Banks and Elsewhere in
NC,
Scientists
Tread
Water,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar.
15,
2014),
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/statepolitics/article10298660.html [https://perma.cc/DET7-ZYKK].
357. BUECHLER, supra note 245, at 4.
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seen as following from the mid-twentieth century civil rights
movement, ignoring precedents in the nineteenth century
women’s suffrage movement and temperance movements, and
in the abolition movement itself. Indeed, British abolitionism
may be the true antecedent for the modern social movement,
for it was in late seventeenth century Britain that the domestic
population found the economic and political space, combined
with the nascent public media, to organize and advocate
around an issue. As historian Seymour Drescher notes in his
history of abolition, abolitionist Granville Sharp’s organizing
tactics found fertile soil in emerging British traditions of
petition, voluntary associations, and press freedom:
In forming this innovative plan, Sharp was tapping into an old
repertoire of collective action within civil societies on both sides
of the Atlantic. British subjects regarded the right to petition as
a fundamental right along with representative assemblies, strong
local government, a plurality of religious communities, abundant
voluntary associations, and newspapers. Petitioning constituted
a weapon in the public sphere that Anglo-American abolitionism
would use intensively during the century to follow.358

Thus, the abolitionists’ collective public advocacy tactics
would seem familiar even to twenty-first century movement
organizers.
i. Mass Petition Drives and Gatherings
Abolitionists mobilized existing social organizations such as
churches to conduct petition drives, regularly delivering
petitions signed by thousands of people in both Great Britain
and the United States. Interestingly, abolitionists are among
the first social movements to mobilize women as a political
force (despite their lack of suffrage), and it was a point of
contention in Parliament whether Parliament need consider
petitions signed by women given their lack of franchise.359 On
this side of the Atlantic, petitions for Congressional action to
abolish slavery were so numerous that Congress abandoned its

358. DRESCHER, supra note 344, at 105.
359. See id. at 249–50.
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practice of considering every petition addressed to Congress
individually.360
Given the transportation and communications challenges of
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, mass gatherings
of abolitionists were less common. However, a Baltimore
gathering of 4,000 African Americans in 1864 was the largest
mass gathering of the time.361 Eighteenth century petition
drives have their parallel in twentieth and twenty-first century
marches on Washington, D.C., as Congress and the media have
come to ignore constituent petitions and the media gives
coverage to (at least some) mass gatherings.
ii. Lawsuits
Centuries before the school desegregation litigation efforts of
the NAACP, eighteenth century British abolitionists turned to
the courts to establish Britain as “free soil.” Granville Sharp
brought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of James Somerset,
the slave of a Virginia planter who had been brought to Great
Britain by his master, escaped, and was seized on British soil
by his master.362 The case came before Lord Mansfield,
England’s Chief Justice, who ruled that since the condition of
slavery was odious and unknown at common law, it could exist
in Britain only through positive law (act of Parliament), in the
absence of which a putative master had no rights to his slave
on domestic British soil.363 Somerset was freed, and Somerset’s
case established Great Britain as “free soil” so that once a slave
had set foot there he could not be re-enslaved by his master—at
least as long as he remained on British soil.364 The disastrous
Dred Scott decision in the United States was an attempt by
abolitionists to establish for the Northern states the same “free
soil” principle adopted the previous century in Great Britain.365
And Somerset’s case may be the original paradigm for impact
litigation seeking to obtain through judicial remedies social
progress that was politically unavailable in the legislative

360. Id. at 302, 307–08.
361.
CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS, FREEDOM’S PORT:
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
COMMUNITY OF BALTIMORE, 1790–1860, at 240–41 (1997).
362. Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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branches, inspiring the school desegregation efforts of the civil
rights movement, and the climate movement’s litigation
initiatives seeking a judicially-ordered response to climate
change under the public trust doctrine.
iii. Lobbying and Legislative Efforts
William Wilberforce’s abolitionist speeches to parliament are
legendary, and have their modern analogues in the
Washington, D.C. presence and lobbying efforts by U.S.
environmental organizations seeking a legislative response to
climate change.366
iv. Direct Action and Civil Disobedience
In the United States, abolitionists engaged in one of the most
organized and extensive civil disobedience actions in history.
Thousands of Northerners defied the Fugitive Slave Act by
aiding escaped slaves to freedom in Canada on the
Underground Railroad.367 John Brown’s disastrous assault on
Harpers Ferry is an example of violent direct action that,
although spectacular in its failure, helped to galvanize the
abolitionist movement.368
v. Values-Oriented Social Justice Issues Framing
This may be the most significant parallel between
abolitionism and climate activism.
The underlying issue
framing is one of social justice and altruism—there are
aggrieved parties (slaves for abolitionists, future generations
for climate activists), but those aggrieved are completely
excluded from the social and political system being organized
into action. Both movements appeal to the altruism of their
adherents—concern for the well-being of others who are remote
in time and place. To be sure, abolitionists in both the U.K.
and the United States gained some support from a nascent
labor movement fearing competition from coerced labor.369 But
most adherents acted out of altruistic concern for others
366. WILBERFORCE, supra note 347.
367. TOM CALARCO, PEOPLE OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY, at xxii (Greenwood Press, 2008).
368. See id. at 50.
369. MICHAEL GERMANA, STANDARDS OF VALUE: MONEY, RACE, AND LITERATURE IN
AMERICA 20 (Univ. of Iowa Press, 2009).
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suffering injustice.370 This factor distinguishes the climate
movement from both the civil rights movement (organized, at
least initially, by the aggrieved group) and the temperance
movement (though perhaps not directly aggrieved by alcohol
consumption, but socially threatened by it).
The success of abolitionists in organizing on behalf of a
remote, politically powerless group of victims may be the most
hopeful sign for the possible success of a climate activism
movement.
vi. Group Identification and Product Boycotts
Sociologists note that markers of group identification are an
important aspect of social movement success.
A social
movement must create an “in-group” of shared characteristics,
and if Professor Stoddard’s culture shifting marker for
successful legal change is to be met, that “in-group” must
become dominant in society.371 Like the teetotaling temperance
advocates, abolitionists made significant lifestyle changes to
internalize their commitment to their cause; significantly,
many abolitionists refused to consume sugar, since most sugar
was produced by slave labor.372
The climate activists’
movement has not, to date, achieved a unifying lifestyle
marker for group identity. 350.org’s “fossil free” campaign is
not a campaign to have members live free of fossil fuels, but
simply to divest themselves (and their organizations) of
ownership of fossil fuel industry stock.373 Since the vast
majority of Americans don’t own stocks, this would be the
equivalent of abolitionist society’s expecting no more lifestyle
change than divestment from slave ownership, something no
domestic abolitionist could have been doing anyway.
In contrast to the current climate movement, for the most
part, many eighteenth century American abolitionists would
not eat sugar or purchase cotton products produced by slave

370.

DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN
266 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006).
371. See Jennifer A. Peeples, Aggressive Mimicry: The Rhetoric of Wise Use and the
Environmental Movement, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 10
(Susan L. Senecah ed., 2005); see also supra note 245.
372. See generally Mimi Sheller, Bleeding Humanity and Gendered Embodiments:
From Antislavery Sugar Boycotts to Ethical Consumers, 2 HUMANITY 171 (2011).
373. About Fossil Free, supra note 274.
THE NEW WORLD
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labor.374 They substituted honey and maple syrup for sugar,
and linen and broadcloth for cotton fabrics.375
Regional
abolitionist society meetings included resolutions requiring
abstention from the produce of slavery, such as this February
17, 1836 resolution of the Vermont Anti-Slavery Society:
“Resolved, That by consuming the produce of the labor of
slaves, we are directly sustaining the iniquitous system of
slavery; and that therefore, as abolitionists, we are called upon
to abstain from using such articles as are believed to come to us
through a polluted channel.”376
The pages of radical
abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison’s newspaper, The
Liberator, are full of notices for stores carrying “free goods.”377
No similar resolutions for abstention from fossil fuels have
appeared in the climate movement literature as of yet. It is as
if the climate movement agrees with ExxonMobil that, “We do
not have a readily available replacement for the energy that
provides the means of living that the world has today.”378
This is not to say that abolitionists were unanimous in their
abstemiousness. The pages of The Liberator also carry on a
debate about whether it was hypocritical for an abolitionist to
consume the products of slave labor.379
Those favoring
374. Mike Kaye, The Tools of Abolition, BBC (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
history/british/abolition/abolition_tools_gallery_07.shtml
[https://perma.cc/G6YZA3HN].
375. Abolition and Free Produce, MID-HUDSON ANTISLAVERY HIST. PROJECT (citing
Carol Faulkner, The Root of the Evil: Free Produce and Radical Antislavery, 1820–
1860, 27 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 377–405 (2007)), http://pages.vassar.edu/
mhantislaveryhistoryproject/abolitionists-and-free-produce/
[https://perma.cc/S7MW726U] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
376. VT. ANTI-SLAVERY SOC., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE VERMONT ANTISLAVERY SOCIETY: WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING, HOLDEN IN
MIDDLEBURY, FEBRUARY 16 & 17, 1836 (1836), https://archive.org/stream/
ASPC0005073700/ASPC0005073700_djvu.txt
[https://perma.cc/3T9E-G3MB]
(last
visited Feb. 2, 2016).
377. William Lloyd Garrison & Isaac Knapp, Pierce’s Free Grocery Store,
LIBERATOR, June 11, 1831, at 95, http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1831/06/11/theliberator-01-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG62-BQSG]; Charles Wise, Free Cotton Goods,
LIBERATOR, Oct. 2, 1840, at 160, http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1840/10/02/theliberator-10-40.pdf. [https://perma.cc/TM8D-K7F2].
378. Conway Irwin, Exxon CEO: Climate Change Poses Significant Risk, but
Outcome
Is
Uncertain,
BREAKING
ENERGY
(May
29,
2013),
http://breakingenergy.com/2013/05/29/ exxon-ceo-climate-change-poses-significant-riskbut-outcome-is-uncertain/ [https://perma.cc/655A-JVFY].
379. See, e.g., C.F., The Products of Slave Labor, LIBERATOR, Jan. 4, 1834, at 2,
http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1834/01/04/the-liberator-04-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84UV-DG5C].
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abstention argued that purchase of slave produce made the
purchaser an accessory to the crime as surely as the receiver of
stolen goods, and that the surest way to end slavery was to
eliminate the market for its products.380 Others argued that
there was no inherent vice in the goods themselves, that
righteous abstention alienated the broader public, and that a
boycott by abolitionists would not be significant enough to have
any economic effect on the slave economy.381
One
correspondent, writing in The Liberator, explicitly adopts the
inconsequentialist argument against abstentionism:
Is that course of conduct, probably adopted by a few only, and
directly tending to deprive them of bread, and increase the
distresses they already experience as a consequent of slavery; is
that course, I say, the most proper—the most effectual toward
the attainment of the end proposed—to wit—the abolition of
slavery? And if there be not reason to believe that its practical
bearing will be as a means of abolition, I think we cannot be
called upon to adopt it.382

This nineteenth century argument against abstention based
on the ineffectuality of individual action has been echoed in the
climate change context in an essay in Environmental Ethics by
Professor Joakim Sandberg entitled “My Emissions Make No
Difference”:
Climate Change and the Argument from

See, e.g., Lea W. Gause, The Products of Slave Labor, LIBERATOR,
Apr. 9, 1847, at 59, http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1847/04/09/theliberator-17-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/36RV-3EKQ]; Eli Hambleton,
Union Free-Produce Society, LIBERATOR, Aug. 4, 1848, at 124,
http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1848/08/04/the-liberator-18-31.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BRZ6-BC5B]; Use of Slave Productions, LIBERATOR,
Aug. 27, 1931, at 138, http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1831/08/27/theliberator-01-35.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWT8-G3PT].
381 See, e.g., C.F., The Products of Slave Labor, LIBERATOR, Dec. 14,
1833, at 199, http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1833/12/14/the-liberator03-50.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MRL-ARTH]; Cases of Conscience,
LIBERATOR, Dec. 1, 1848, at 190, http://fair-use.org/theliberator/1848/12/01/the-liberator-18-48.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYQ94P7C]; J.H. Fowler, The Products of Slave Labor, LIBERATOR, Mar. 16,
1860, at 44, http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1860/03/16/the-liberator30-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2XJ-FR3M].
380

382. C.F., supra note 379.
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Inconsequentialism.383
Sandberg argues that since each
individual’s contribution to climate change is so vanishingly
small, there is no individual ethical duty to reduce carbon
emissions in the absence of organized collective action.384
William Lloyd Garrison himself seems to have changed
positions on the question, initially favoring abstention and then
later accepting the impracticality of abstention and the need to
carry on the battle for abolition on more favorable turf.
Garrison wrote:
At an early period of the anti-slavery enterprise, we were led, for
a time, to regard the use of slave productions as personally
involving a direct support of the slave system; but we were soon
satisfied that we erred in judgment on this subject, that it was
wasting time upon what no man could strictly reduce to practice,
and that nothing would be gained by pressing it upon public
attention. There were a thousand strong and vital issues that
could be made with the Slave Power, and we deemed it far more
important to grapple with these, than to raise questions of
conscience, which no casuistry could settle like a moral axiom.385

William Lloyd Garrison’s 1847 apologia for non-abstention
has also been echoed by 350.org’s Bill McKibben. In a 2013
essay in Orion Magazine, McKibben justifies his use of fossil
fuels to travel around the country arguing for an end to the
fossil fuel economy with a similar consequentialist argument
that it is important to carry on his advocacy, that “what needs
to change are not individuals but precisely that system” of
fossil fuel powered economy.386 To be fair, McKibben powers
his campaign bus with carbon neutral biofuels, but his rallies
count on fossil fueled travel by supporters.387 Like Garrison,
McKibben sees more fertile ground to engage with the fossil
fuel industry than advocating for a boycott of its products. He
urges his followers to follow up modest decreases in their fossil

383. Sandberg, supra note 42.
384. Id.
385. William Lloyd Garrison, Products of Slave Labor, LIBERATOR, Mar. 5, 1847, at
38, http://fair-use.org/the-liberator/1847/03/05/the-liberator-17-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MH23-XZU9].
386. McKibben, supra note 326.
387. See Bill McKibben, The Case for Fossil-Fuel Divestment, ROLLING STONE (Feb.
22, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-case-for-fossil-fuel-divestment20130222 [https://perma.cc/PSC4-QAX9].
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fuel use (as by driving a hybrid fossil fuel powered car) with
dedicated advocacy to change the system.388
Nineteenth century non-abstentious abolitionists defended
their position on the grounds that the evil of slavery was in the
production of cotton and sugar, not in the use of the goods
themselves. As a December 14, 1833 correspondent wrote: “[i]t
is confessed and agreed by all, that the use of sugar, cotton,
tobacco and other products of slave labor, is not in itself,
morally wrong; but it is said to become so, because it is the
product of a system of wickedness.”389 According to that writer,
drawing the analogy to temperance: “[i]f the wheat raised by
slave labor be contaminated, so is the wheat raised by the labor
of the intemperate man, and to be consistent we must carry the
effects of this doctrine as far in the one case as the other.”390
This writer’s point that the slave produced sugar and cotton
was not physically contaminated and worthy of sanction was
adopted one hundred years later by one of the Supreme Court’s
more ignominious decisions, Hammer v. Dagenhart, which
struck down Congress’s attempt to ban commerce in goods
produced by child labor.391 Similar reasoning was adopted by
the World Trade Organization when, in the 1990s, it
sanctioned the United States for enforcing laws banning the
import of tuna caught using methods that asphyxiated
dolphins—there was nothing inherently wrong with the goods
themselves that would justify an import ban.392
But there is an important difference between fossil fuels and
slave-produced cotton, child labor produced furniture, or
canned tuna produced with insufficient care for marine
mammals.
In these other cases, the vice exists in the
production of the goods, not their consumption. When it comes
to fossil fuels, the global climate evil is due largely to their
consumption, not their production. It is primarily the burning
of fossil fuels that creates the greenhouse gases that warm the
climate. So even though some abolitionists might in good
388. See id.
389. William Lloyd Garrison & Isaac Knapp, Declaration of the National AntiSlavery Convention, LIBERATOR, Dec. 14, 1833, at 198, http://fair-use.org/theliberator/1833/12/14/the-liberator-03-50.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MRL-ARTH].
390. Id.
391. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
392. See Report of the Panel, US—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc.
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
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conscious eat slave sugar and wear slave cotton while
advocating for the end of slavery, climate advocates do not have
the same excuse.
A conclusion that abolition is the most apt analog for a
successful legal antidote to climate change may be troubling.
Mere legal, social, and political activism was not sufficient to
prompt adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and cultural
internalization of the new anti-slavery norm. Unlike Great
Britain, abolitionism in the United States failed to achieve
political success prior to the Civil War.393 It took a civil war
with the greatest loss of life in American military history to
accomplish the formal eradication of slavery.394 And while
Northern abolitionist sentiment contributed to Southern
secession and the start of the Civil War, it is impossible to say
when (if ever) abolitionism might have achieved political
success in the United States in the absence of the Civil War.
Even after adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, it arguably
took nearly another century for cultural internalization of the
anti-slavery norm in the Southern states, as Jim Crow laws
and peonage practices kept African Americans in Southern
states in a status of economic and political servitude even
though not enforced in the form of chattel slavery.395 Nor does
regional conflict over painful climate response measures seem
out of the question, as belief in climate science breaks down on
regional and urban-rural divides and the impacts of reducing
fossil fuel use may fall most heavily on rural populations who
currently drive longer distances than their urban
counterparts.396
VI. CONCLUSION
The accepted science and ineluctable mathematics of
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, combined with
the glacial pace of the national and international legal response
to this global environmental challenge, virtually ensure that
the ultimate response to mitigate global warming will have to
393. DRESCHER, supra note 344, at 329.
394. Id. at 331.
395. William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865–1940: A
Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31 (1976); Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in
the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1984).
396. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 2009 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY 57 (2011).
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be a ban on the use of greenhouse gas emitting fossil fuels.
Such a ban is defensible based on the utilitarian,
consequentialist ethics of avoiding grievous harm to other
people. Existing statutory authorities might well support
imposition of such a ban, and congressional commerce and
treaty powers also appear sufficient to support new legislation
implementing such a ban. Takings or fundamental rights
challenges to such a ban seem likely to fail, at least under
current law.
A statutory, administrative, or even constitutional ban on the
use of fossil fuels is thus possible. Not all normative legal
change is successful in its implementation, however. Law
change can mediate culture change only when the law reform
efforts are paired with an effective social movement.
Ultimately, climate change mitigation will require complete
abandonment of fossil fuel consumption, a social and economic
change of an order of magnitude equal to other law-mediated
(or attempted) social changes such as civil rights, prohibition,
and abolition.
While the civil rights movement has been the model for most
subsequent social change activism, at least in the United
States, climate activism has an important structural difference
from the civil rights movement—the civil rights movement was
a grievance-prompted identity movement. Climate activism,
which lacks true climate change victims among its members,
more resembles a values-oriented resource-mobilizing
movement. In this way, it may resemble the temperance
movement more than the civil rights movement. This is an
unfortunate analogy, as the temperance movement is a
spectacular example of a movement that enjoyed complete
success politically and in changing the normative laws, but it
was a spectacular failure in its implementation and failed to
change the culture.
Not all values-oriented legal-social reform movements are
doomed to failure. Abolitionism, which had its genesis in an
active and open domestic political culture in eighteenth century
Great Britain, is an example of a values-oriented, altruistic law
and social reform movement that enjoyed ultimate and global
success on the order that will be required for even a partial
response to the coming climate catastrophe. The climate
movement has more maturing to do if it is to move beyond
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mere resource-mobilization and become a true movement for
social change. For one thing, the movement may have to create
a better definition of group membership through lifestyle
choices—such as the emergence of leadership that has
foresworn not just investment in fossil fuels, but also their
consumption as well.

